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FREE TRADE IN ELECTRIC POWER
Joel B. Eisen* and Felix Mormann**
Abstract
This Article develops the core legal framework of a new electricity
trading ecosystem in which anyone, anytime, anywhere, can trade
electricity in any amount with anyone else. The proliferation of solar and
other distributed energy resources, business model innovation in the
sharing economy, and climate change present enormous challenges—and
opportunities—for America’s energy economy. But the electricity industry
is ill-equipped to adapt to and benefit from these transformative forces,
with much of its physical infrastructure, regulatory institutions, and
business models relics of the early days of electrification. This Article
suggests a systematic rethinking to usher in a new trading paradigm and
propel the electric utility industry into the twenty-first century.
This model has the potential to revolutionize the way electricity is
generated, delivered, and used without requiring dramatic legal reform or
radically new technologies. Instead, this Article draws on recent Supreme
Court precedent and readily available technologies to democratize the
electric grid and unlock free trade in electric power. It refines and expands
pilot initiatives currently under way in California and New York to
combine existing wholesale markets with new trading platforms similar to
Airbnb and Uber. Enhanced market access will empower previously
captive consumers to emancipate themselves from their local utilities
while also ensuring the proper valuation and integration of a diverse
portfolio of energy resources.
Transformative change, however necessary and beneficial in the long
run, will not come easily in an industry famous for its resistance to reform
efforts of any kind. Accordingly, this proposal does not start with a clean
slate, but, rather, envisions a hybrid system where competitive markets
coexist with traditional utility governance structures while regulators and
stakeholders adjust to the new trading paradigm.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article develops the core legal framework under which anyone, anytime,
anywhere, can trade electricity in any amount with anyone else. Going well beyond
the scope of any contemporary discussion, the authors propose an ecosystem in
which electricity transforms from a basic service into a widely traded commodity.
Much of the physical infrastructure, regulatory institutions, and business
models of today’s electric grid dates back to the early days of electrification. Since

2018]

FREE TRADE IN ELECTRIC POWER

51

the late nineteenth century, electricity has been generated by monopoly utilities in
large, remotely sited power plants, and delivered to ratepayers via wires designed
for one-way traffic, all subject to regulatory oversight by state and federal agencies.1
These structures and processes helped launch America’s electricity industry. But
they are ill-equipped to address the daunting challenges and enormous opportunities
facing the industry today. The proliferation of smaller-scale distributed energy
resources, fast paced technology and business model innovation, and anthropogenic
climate change, among others, require a systematic rethinking of the way electricity
is generated, delivered, and used.
Integration of a growing share of solar, wind, and other distributed energy
resources offers a multitude of environmental, economic, and security benefits.
Traditional thermal power plants are known to emit carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases that exacerbate global climate change as well as a series of more
locally felt air pollutants. Renewable generators, on the other hand, are practically
carbon neutral and cause virtually no pollution to their immediate environment,
allowing them to be sited closer to consumers. The resulting proximity between
generation and consumption eliminates the need for costly new transmission and
alleviates congestion issues in today’s increasingly outdated and, hence, often
undersized transmission system. With their greater geographic dispersion,
distributed energy resources have the potential to greatly improve the electric grid’s
reliability and resilience reducing, for example, the vulnerability to isolated terrorist
attacks on individual power plants or the risk of cascading brownouts and blackouts.
But today’s grid is poorly adapted to accommodate and harness these and other
benefits of distributed energy resources. Until now, grid operations and management
have generally assumed a unidirectional flow of electricity—starting with utilities
that develop central power stations and generate electricity for sale and delivery to
customers. Yet, most solar and other distributed energy resources are owned and
operated by customers, not utilities, and there is little centralized utility control over
these assets and no rules to govern, let alone promote, multidirectional interaction.
The prevailing regulatory model—another relic of the early days of
electrification—protects incumbent utilities against competition from distributed
energy resources and other innovative technologies. As utilities embrace innovation2
with industry typical caution,3 however, new entrants to the electricity sector in

1

See, e.g., New York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 13–14 (2002) (discussing the shared
allocation of regulatory authority between state and federal agencies).
2
Following noted economist Joseph Schumpeter, the authors define innovation as a
three-staged process that distinguishes between invention as an idea’s first practical
demonstration, innovation as its first commercial application, and diffusion as the market
penetration of a technology or process. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Redvers Opie trans., Harv. Univ. Press 2d ed. 1936).
3
See AM. ENERGY INNOVATION COUNCIL, A BUSINESS PLAN FOR AMERICA’S ENERGY
FUTURE 6 (2010) (reporting R&D spending as share of sales to be more than 60 times lower
for the energy industry than for pharmaceuticals); see also Felix Mormann, Requirements
for a Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L. Q. 903, 917 (2011) [hereinafter Mormann,
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restructured parts of the country are increasingly outpacing them with novel
technologies, services, and business models.4 The resulting threat to the utility
business model, sometimes described as a looming “death spiral,” raises difficult
questions over the future composition of reliable electric service.5
This Article proposes a new trading paradigm for electric power that promotes
greater competition and innovation across the value chain, while recognizing the
need for a continued, albeit modernized role for utility incumbents. This approach
has the potential to revolutionize America’s energy economy without requiring
dramatic legal reform or radically new technologies and business models. Instead,
this proposal relies on recent Supreme Court precedent,6 readily available
technologies, such as smart meters and solar photovoltaics,7 and well-established
business structures such as existing wholesale electricity markets and trading
platforms comparable to those of Airbnb and Uber.8 The new power trading
Renewables Revolution] (tracing the electric utility industry’s low R&D spending to
traditional models of rate regulation).
4
Solar power combined with energy storage is an example of such innovation and
synergies, as exemplified by the merger of Tesla and SolarCity. Leslie Picker & Bill Vlasic,
In Tesla-SolarCity Deal, a Bet on Musk’s Vision and Investors’ Patience, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/business/dealbook/teslasolar-city-merger-elon-musk.html [https://perma.cc/CU4K-DJC6].
5
Joel B. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, But How Dead, and What
Replaces It?, 8 GEO. WASH. J. OF ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 3, 4 (2017) [hereinafter Eisen, Dual
Electricity Federalism] (discussing the threat to utilities’ business models from increasing
deployments of DERs); Elisabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition
Mean a Death Spiral for Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L. J. 1, 44 (2014); Felix Mormann,
Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1668–69 (2015) [hereinafter Mormann,
Clean Energy Federalism]; PETER KIND & ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE ADVOCATES,
DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A
CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 1 (2013).
6
See, e.g., Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1291 (2016) (affirming the
Fourth Circuit’s finding that a state scheme that provided subsidies through state mandated
contracts “impermissibly intrudes upon the wholesale electricity market”); F.E.R.C. v. Elec.
Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 768 (2016) (noting that FERC “may not regulate either
within-state wholesale sales or . . . retail sales of electricity”); ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 1591, 1594 (2015) (holding that the Natural Gas Act “does not pre-empt . . . statelaw antitrust suits”).
7
The cost of solar power is dropping, and it has achieved “grid parity” (cost equal to
that of power generated from fossil fuels) under favorable conditions in many parts of the
nation, with costs continuing to drop. BRONSKI ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF GRID DEFECTION
6 (2014). For a discussion of smart meters’ role in a modern grid, see Joel B. Eisen, Smart
Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2013)
[hereinafter Eisen, Smart Regulation].
8
Others have suggested applying this analogy to the electric industry. See, e.g., Rocky
Mountain Inst., An Airbnb or Uber for the Electricity Grid?, GRID UNLOCKED (Sept. 2, 2014,
10:24 PM), http://www.gridunlocked.com/2014/09/02/an-airbnb-or-uber-for-the-electricitygrid/ [https://perma.cc/HC3W-RGAE] (suggesting that “the electricity grid be next to go the
way of a sharing economy”). Part III, discusses this idea and propose its adoption.
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paradigm can be implemented in the near to medium term, not decades from now.
Change is already underway as evidenced by the proliferation of distributed energy
resources at what is commonly referred to as “the edge of the grid.”9 This approach
turns the idea of the “edge of the grid” on its head, transforming it from a
marginalized locus to the center stage on which the future of the electricity sector
will be decided.
The advantages of free trade in electric power are diverse and numerous. This
Article highlights the significant economic and grid management benefits. From an
economic perspective, an electricity trading ecosystem allows for proper valuation
and, ultimately, monetization of the electricity products and services that distributed
energy resources provide to the grid—with inadequate, if any, reward offered under
the current system. As these distributed resources continue to proliferate, the grid
requires an increasingly inclusive control paradigm. The new power trading
paradigm provides critical economic incentives for those who construct and
upgrade, and own and manage the assets necessary to maintain reliability of service
in an increasingly multidimensional grid.
“Electricity trading ecosystem” is used to describe a new environment that
connects many different persons and entities through a wide range of interactions
across the electric grid. The authors envision a future where, at the traditional end
of the spectrum, incumbent utilities might continue to buy and sell electricity. At the
same time, a new paradigm incorporating trading platforms can and should enable
more innovative transactions among more nontraditional actors. Owners of
residential solar power systems, for instance, could trade their power with neighbors
who, in turn, might provide backup storage capacity for cloudy days. In this
ecosystem, individual users of electricity are no longer limited to the role of
consumers at the cul-de-sac of a grid operating in one-way traffic mode.10 Rather,
they interact with the grid as sophisticated agents who both buy and sell electricity
in multidimensional markets created for this purpose. Electric power itself will cease
to be a basic service provided to end users by an oligopoly of electric utilities.
Instead, electricity will become a fungible commodity with value understood and
capitalized upon by a broad spectrum of market participants in a wide array of
transactions. National laboratories and scholars outside of the legal field have done

9

See, e.g., David Roberts, What’s Threatening Utilities: Innovation at the Edge of the
Grid (with dik-diks!), GRIST (May 29, 2013), http://grist.org/article/whats-threateningutilities-innovation-at-the-edge-of-the-grid/ [https://perma.cc/8YXQ-V4X3] (discussing
“where innovation on the distribution edge is headed”).
10
For decades, many have aspired to this. In the 1970s, for example, MIT professor
Fred Schweppe and others first proposed involving electricity consumers in markets. FRED
C. SCHWEPPE ET AL., HOMEOSTATIC CONTROL: THE UTILITY/CUSTOMER MARKETPLACE FOR
ELECTRIC POWER 8 (1981) (showing in Figure 1 a proposed “Energy Marketplace,”
presciently showing a “Marketplace Controller,” “Energy Brokers,” and “Information
Consultants” as intermediaries).
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excellent work on the conceptual framework for widespread electricity trading,
mostly under the banner of “transactive energy.”11
The time has come to reimagine the electric grid as a multidimensional
networked ecosystem that invites new resources and actors without sacrificing the
current system’s peerless reliability.12 The burgeoning literature on energy law and
policy tends to hone in on individual aspects and components of the electric system,
such as: promoting greater renewable energy development;13 building more
transmission lines;14 and clarifying the shared allocation of authority between
federal and state regulation.15 The benefits of such focused inquiries
notwithstanding, the complex interdependencies among the electricity sector’s
various components, call for a more holistic, network-wide analysis.

11

See THE GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURE COUNCIL, GRIDWISE TRANSACTIVE ENERGY
FRAMEWORK VERSION 1.0 iii (2015); D.J. HAMMERSTROM ET AL., VALUATION OF
TRANSACTIVE SYSTEMS 3.1 (2016); HOWARD HARARY, NIST AND ENGINEERING
LABORATORY UPDATE 15–16 (2016), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
2016/09/01/sgac-meeting-presentations-07-13-2016.pdf (detailing testing and standards
development programs at the National Institute of Standards and Technology to support
transactive energy); Lynne Kiesling, Implications of Smart Grid Innovation for
Organizational Models in Electricity Distribution, in WILEY HANDBOOK OF SMART GRID
HANDBOOK (John Wiley & Sons eds., 2016); D.J. HAMMERSTROM ET AL., THE TRANSACTIVE
SYSTEM 2.3–2.4 (2015), https://www.smartgrid.gov/files/TPR02TheTransactiveCoordinat
ionSystem.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG8Y-QRQ8] (discussing the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory’s field demonstrations to test transactive energy concepts, including the Olympic
Peninsula Project and its successor, the Pacific Northwest Smart Grid Demonstration, which
linked utility customers in five Pacific Northwest states.). This proposal builds on these
works, making selective use of specific regulatory initiatives as foundations, and extends
them to a national system for the generation and delivery of electricity that would take shape
in the years or even decades to come.
12
“Reliability” has a very different meaning in an ecosystem where numerous and
diverse electricity resources are brought on the grid and traded, posing considerable
challenges to policymakers charged with safeguarding reliability. Infra Part IV.
13
See Joel B. Eisen, Residential Renewable Energy: By Whom?, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L.
REV. 339, 367 (2011) [hereinafter Eisen, Residential Renewable Energy]; Felix Mormann,
Enhancing the Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, 42 ENVTL. L. 681, 734 (2012).
14
See James J. Hoecker & Douglas W. Smith, Regulatory Federalism and Development
of Electric Transmission: A Brewing Storm?, 35 ENERGY L. J. 71, 88–89 (2014); Alexandra
B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy:
A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1873 (2012).
15
See William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and
Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 893 (2016); Joel B. Eisen,
FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform The Electric Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783,
1843–45 (2016) [hereinafter Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority]; Felix Mormann,
Constitutional Challenges and Regulatory Opportunities for State Climate Policy
Innovation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 241–42 (2017) [hereinafter Mormann, State
Climate Policy Innovation]; Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX.
L. REV. 399, 465–66 (2016).
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Robust markets for wholesale transactions have become a staple of electricity
trading in many parts of the country, so the first broad brushstrokes of this blueprint
have already been sketched. This approach retains these markets along with their
regional governance mechanisms, and expands them to facilitate trading by new
market entrants that aggregate smaller amounts of electricity into larger blocks. In
addition, the authors propose a new form of platform-based markets established and
overseen by state public utility commissions for bilateral transactions among
individuals trading smaller amounts of electricity and related activities. These are
termed “state markets”16 to emphasize their geographic scope, to avoid any potential
confusion with ongoing retail restructuring initiatives, and to invoke the states’
historical role in regulating direct sales to end users, which these markets would
enable.17
The type of multidimensional market envisioned has become increasingly
common, most notably in the so called “sharing” economy, with examples including
Airbnb, Uber, and others.18 On these platforms, participants trade with each other
over networks, under preapproved rules, designed to facilitate and simplify their
interactions. As economists have demonstrated, properly designed platform markets
have positive “network effects,” such as greater innovation and consumer
participation.19 This Article considers the prospect for such positive externalities an
important reason to promote more trading in the electricity sector.
This approach builds on the progress that two pioneering states—California and
New York—are making toward identifying and crafting critical building blocks of
an electricity trading ecosystem. In both cases, the states are moving forward with
utility participation and approval. California’s initiative affects existing wholesale
markets, while New York seeks to create new markets to be administered by its
utilities. This approach combines expanded and refined versions of these two
programs into a unified, multidimensional “smart” platform architecture for trading
and delivering electricity that can support a variety of business models to enable all
or part of the system’s functions. The authors lack a crystal orb, so this model
incorporates the flexibility and adaptability required to support all of the types of
transactions that the new electricity trading ecosystem can and should enable.
Part I begins the explanation of the proposal with a description of the new
trading paradigm and a non-exhaustive overview of the diverse and numerous types
of interactions envisioned. Against this background, Part I discusses the need for
fundamental physical, regulatory, and business reforms of the electric grid to support
transactions in new products and services among a wide range of entities. As part of

16

This Article deliberately does not use the “retail” label for these markets, as they
would facilitate both retail and wholesale transactions, with the latter occurring at a smaller
scale than their FERC approved counterparts.
17
See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2015); New York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 14 (2002) (“States
have jurisdiction over the retail sale of power . . . .”).
18
See Sarah E. Light, Precautionary Federalism and the Sharing Economy, 66 EMORY
L. J. 333, 335 (2017).
19
See infra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
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this discussion, the authors lay out some of the many reasons why a system in which
anyone can trade electricity should exist.
Part II establishes and defines five overarching goals that any electricity trading
ecosystem should strive to achieve, and seven core principles of this specific
proposal. Unlike some visions for the electricity sector’s future,20 this approach is
grid-centered and does not envision full disruption of utilities—by cable TV
providers or Internet companies such as Google and Facebook—as an inevitable
outcome. Instead, the authors propose an evolutionary design that builds on the
existing system and initiatives already underway. This Article contemplates that
growing expertise with these experimental policies will inexorably usher in the new
trading paradigm.
The authors recognize the challenges inherent in any attempt to develop free
markets within the context of a heavily regulated environment, and the potential for
attendant waste and inefficiencies. Nonetheless, given the unique characteristics of
this industry, the authors argue that utilities and other stakeholders with vested
interests in the electricity sector, and regulators seeking to maintain system stability
and reliability, will prefer a policy and legal framework that is evolutionary rather
than revolutionary. This approach also respects the difficult, and shifting, nature of
the divide between federal and state regulatory authority over the electric grid.21
Part III places this model in the context of ongoing policy experiments with
greater power trading. The first such experiment is California’s initiative to allow
owners of distributed energy resources (“DERs”), such as small-scale solar power,
to sell electricity into the California Independent System Operator’s (“CAISO”)
wholesale markets via providers that aggregate individual resources into larger
blocks. The second is New York’s ambitious plan to transform its distribution
utilities into system operators and administrators of markets for electricity and
related products and services.
Next, this Article discusses how these experiments could combine and evolve
into the foundation of an electricity trading ecosystem. Both experiments are in
early, quasi pilot stages and both would have to be expanded considerably to allow
for full consumer market access. Accordingly, this Article draws on these initiatives
to develop a general framework, leaving many implementation details to later
discussions. The authors propose to modify and extend the CAISO aggregation
system to all wholesale markets, as contemplated in the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission’s (“FERC”) recent notice of proposed rulemaking on DER
aggregation.22 This Article further proposes that states adopt programs similar to that
20

Todd Woody, Who Will Compete With Energy Companies in the Future? Apple,
Comcast, and You, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 4. 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2013/11/who-will-compete-with-energy-companies-in-the-future-apple-comcastand-you/281109/ [https://perma.cc/9BSF-8B7X] (explaining that David Crane, CEO of
NRG Energy, predicts that cable TV companies will compete with utilities).
21
See infra Part IV.B.
22
Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission
Organizations and Independent System Operators, 81 Fed. Reg. 86,522-01 (proposed Nov.
30, 2016) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). In light of its reliance on wholesale markets
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of New York and establish markets open to individual and other small-scale
participants. These two steps, and coordination between wholesale and state
markets, will go a long way toward ensuring that sellers of electricity and related
products and services have direct access to buyers throughout the nation.
Part IV discusses some technological and legal innovations required for the
transition to free electricity trading, and potential obstacles. To be sure, the exact
parameters of the new power trading paradigm will depend on the design and
implementation choices of policymakers, regulators, grid operators, incumbent
utilities, generators, and consumers and suppliers of electricity, among other
stakeholders. Yet, while the precise details remain a moving target, general attributes
are beginning to emerge,23 marking an inflection point to propose and define an
overall direction and scope.
I. MAPPING OUT AN ELECTRICITY TRADING FUTURE
Electricity systems across the United States are in the midst of a gradual but,
ultimately, radical transformation. Restructuring efforts have led to a growing
proliferation of wholesale power markets. Incumbent utilities that once enjoyed
monopoly status, now compete with a growing fleet of merchant generators and, in
some cases, merchant transmission lines. Institutionally, operation and management
of the electric grid is increasingly regionalized in the hands of third-party entities
known as Independent System Operators (“ISO”) and Regional Transmission
Organizations (“RTO”).24 At the same time, public policy support motivated by
for trading aggregated DER resources, this proposal would not extend at present to the
smaller (and shrinking) part of the nation that does not participate in these markets, although
states where utilities are traditionally regulated and do not take part in wholesale markets
could adopt market structures that would have the same robust functions as the state markets
envisioned.
23
See generally GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11 (addressing
transactive energy from multiple perspectives including business and policy considerations,
business models, value creation, and providing conceptual or reference architectures for
transactive energy systems.). As another example of movement toward a technical
foundation for trading, the National Institute of Standards and Technology is conducting a
“Transactive Energy Challenge,” in which teams are proposing technical requirements for,
among other benchmarks, quotes, tenders, transactions and delivery in electricity market
systems. William Cox et al., Common Transactive Services, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS &
TECH (May 2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/nist-sgcps/TEChallenge/TES2016/WilliamCox-CTS.pptx [https://perma.cc/89SM-AHNK].
24
Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority, supra note 15, at 1792–93; Mormann, State
Climate Policy Innovation, supra note 5, at 1634 n.65; Emily Hammond & David B. Spence,
The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141, 153 (2016); Hari M.
Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 50
(discussing current ISOs/RTOs and their geographic coverage and market operations);
Regional Transmission Organization Map, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N,
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp
[https://perma.cc/PR8N-Z6T3]
(last updated Jan. 11, 2017).
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concerns over climate change, energy security, and technology leadership continues
to drive up the share of solar, wind, and other renewables in the electricity mix.25
Meanwhile, the widespread dissemination of smart meters and inverters, along with
other infrastructure upgrades, is making the grid more intelligent.26
The nature and scope of change underfoot along multiple dimensions—
markets, institutions, resources, and technologies, among others—have led some
commentators to speak of a paradigm shift.27 This Article proposes a new trading
paradigm that allows a diverse set of actors to make value-based decisions based on
electricity markets and other economic indicators.28 Historically, the electricity
industry has centered on creating and capturing value along a one-way path from
generation to consumption.29 Today, utilities and third parties alike have far more
opportunities for value creation by expanding the palette of products and services,
particularly as the adoption of DERs empowers customers to provide excess energy
and services to the market. Properly implemented, the ecosystem envisioned has the
capacity to deliver the environmental, economic, and other benefits of current and
future innovations surrounding the electric grid while safeguarding and enhancing
its reliability and resiliency. To do so, the new power trading paradigm will need to
facilitate a plethora of novel transactions of electricity-related products and services
among a wide range of actors.
A. The New Power Trading Paradigm
The new trading paradigm is premised on broad-based participation in grid
operations and management by multiple parties and a more decentralized control
system managed by utility and nonutility actors alike. To trade energy and related
products and services, new markets will enable utilities, new entrants, and electricity
consumers to create and capture value from their transactions. The value derived
from these markets and the pricing signals they provide will offer powerful
incentives for much needed investments in the nation’s dated grid infrastructure.
25

See, e.g., Felix Mormann et al., A Tale of Three Markets: Comparing the Renewable
Energy Experiences of California, Texas, and Germany, 35 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 55, 67–69
(2016) (describing solar and wind deployment trends in California and Texas).
26
See generally Eisen, Smart Regulation, supra note 7, at 10 (discussing the potential
for and benefits of the installation of 65 million smart meters by the end of 2015).
27
See, e.g., Farrokh A. Rahimi & Ali Ipakchi, Transactive Energy Techniques: Closing
the Gap Between Wholesale and Retail Markets, 25 ELEC. J. 29 (2012) (“With the advent of
microgrids and Smart Grid technologies in recent years, another paradigm shift is on the
horizon characterized by active demand-side participation in response to environmental
policies and electricity market prices.”). See also Steven E. Collier, The Emerging Enernet:
Convergence of the Smart Grid with the Internet of Things, IEEE INDUSTRY APPLICATIONS
MAG. 13 (Mar./Apr. 2017) (“The U.S. electric grid is approaching a singularity, i.e., a point
beyond which it will be unrecognizable in terms of the physical, institutional, and economic
principles that apply today.”).
28
GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 24.
29
Id. at 17–18.
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1. Grid Challenges and Distributed Resource Opportunities
No discussion of progress toward free trade in electricity would be complete
without a description of today’s grid, which is a long way from ubiquitous
networking. From a physical perspective, the electric grid has historically served
largely as a one-way system.30 High-voltage transmission lines deliver electricity
generated at power plants, of increasing size, to metropolitan areas and other load
centers, where a network of low-voltage distribution lines facilitates delivery to enduse customers. Since the early days of electrification, economists have considered
the combination of centralized power generation with long-distance transmission
and distribution a desirable attribute of grid architecture enabling economies of scale
for generation.31 But the recent proliferation of solar, wind, and other renewables,
the ever growing importance of customer-sited demand response technology, and
the ongoing electrification of the transport sector call into question the continued
merit of, and need for, a centralized, unidirectional grid.
The economies of scale that justify the construction and aggregation of coal,
nuclear, and other conventional power plants, of ever greater capacity, in a
concentrated geographic area do not apply to the same extent to new utility-scale
renewable or smaller-scale distributed generation facilities. Unlike conventional
power plants, most renewable power generation assets do not require constant
supply with fuel and water for cooling, eliminating the need for costly pipeline,
railroad, and other infrastructure investments.32 Similarly, while utility-scale
projects benefit from smaller overhead costs relative to their output, the modular
design of solar and wind farms that combine a large number of individual solar
panels and wind turbines means that their overall generating efficiency does not
increase along with their cumulative capacity.33 Unlike traditional thermal power

30

See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel, Managing the Future of the Electricity
Grid, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 43, 83 (2017).
31
See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72
MD. L. REV. 773, 791 (2013).
32
Benefits of Renewable Energy Use, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/renewable-energy/public-benefits-of-renewablepower#.WbgHe8iGPD4 [https://perma.cc/6CKX-FR7Z] (last updated Apr. 8, 2013). One
notable exception to the general fuel independence of renewables are biomass generation
facilities that require delivery of woodchips, feedstock, and other biomaterials for
combustion. Id.
33
See, e.g., Mormann, Renewables Revolution, supra note 3, at 923.
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plants that often emit a series of air pollutants,34 renewable generators cause little, if
any,35 pollution allowing them to be sited closer to consumers.
Promoting DERs offers a variety of benefits.36 Closer geographic proximity
between generation and consumption eliminates the need for new transmission and
alleviates congestion issues in the increasingly outdated and, hence, often undersized
existing transmission system.37 Already, pioneering utilities are embracing
distributed generation as an opportunity to avoid traditional investments in
distribution infrastructure by calling upon the marketplace to supply alternatives in
lieu of wire upgrades and expansions.38 In addition, distributed generation has the
potential to greatly improve the electric grid’s reliability and resilience by reducing,
for example, the vulnerability to isolated terrorist attacks on individual power plants
or the risk of cascading brownouts and blackouts.39
Demand response, once a little known niche player, has entered the mainstream
with broader scope and more sophisticated applications.40 In 2016, the Supreme
Court clarified the obligation of electricity wholesale market operators to price and
treat it the same as traditional generation assets bidding into the market.41
34

Kyle Siler-Evans et al., Regional Variations in the Health, Environmental, and
Climate Benefits of Wind and Solar Generation, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11768, 11768
(2013); Jonathan Levy & Jack Spengler, Health Benefits of Emissions Reductions from Older
Power Plants, 9 RISK IN PERSP. 1, 2–4 (2001).
35
But see Bent Ole Gram Mortenson, International Experiences of Wind Energy, 2
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 179, 189 (2008) (discussing potential nuisances from wind
turbines, such as noise, vibrations, shadows, and reflections created by rotor blades).
36
This proposition is discussed in many books, reports and articles, a snapshot of which
include: Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 5, at 1655; Garrick B. Pursley &
Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 897 (2011); Sara C. Bronin, Curbing
Energy Sprawl with Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547, 561 (2010); Joel B. Eisen, Can
Urban Solar Become a “Disruptive” Technology?: The Case For Solar Utilities, 24 NOTRE
DAME J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 53–55 (2010) [hereinafter Eisen, “Disruptive” Technology?].
37
Eisen, “Disruptive” Technology?, supra note 36, at 55; Mormann, Clean Energy
Federalism, supra note 5, at 1655. The grid’s aging exacerbates this; the American Society
of Civil Engineers has given the grid a grade of “D+” for years and has reported on a massive
multibillion dollar investment needed to overhaul it, notwithstanding recent investments in
digitization. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENGRS., FAILURE TO ACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
CURRENT INVESTMENT TRENDS IN ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE 4 (2011).
38
Joel B. Eisen, Demand Response’s Three Generations: Market Pathways and
Challenges in the Modern Electric Grid, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 351, 420 (2017) [hereinafter
Eisen, Modern Electric Grid] (discussing one example, the “Neighborhood Program,” in
which the New York utility Consolidated Edison is using non-wires alternatives to put off
having to build new distribution system infrastructure).
39
David M. Sweet, The Decentralized Energy Paradigm, in ENERGY SECURITY
CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 308, 312–15 (2009).
40
See, e.g., Eisen, Modern Electric Grid, supra note 38, at 372 (describing DR’s history
since the 1970s and showing that until recently there was little market penetration).
41
F.E.R.C. v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016); see generally Joel
B. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. F. 1 (2016) [hereinafter Eisen, FERC v. EPSA] (discussing Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n).
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Guaranteed and nondiscriminatory access to competitive wholesale markets is
expected to boost this fast growing sector.42 Similarly, storage of electricity has
evolved from a niche product to a core component of any strategy to encourage more
renewable energy.43 Recognizing these developments, the term “distributed energy
resources” is increasingly used to collectively represent distributed generation,
demand response, storage, and other alternatives to traditional generation that are
proliferating today.
The electric grid’s current architecture, dating in many places back to the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, is poorly adapted to accommodate and
harness the benefits of these innovations. Until now, grid controls have generally
assumed a unidirectional flow of electricity: starting with utilities that develop
central power stations and generate electricity for sale and delivery to customers. By
contrast, customers, not utilities, own most DERs, and there is little centralized
utility control over them and no rules pertaining to multidirectional interaction. It is
no coincidence that analysts often refer to the buildout of DERs as occurring “at the
edge of the grid.”44 This choice of terminology is revealing in multiple ways. For
starters, it highlights the limited visibility and control of operators over these grid
assets. For example, they might not know the exact capacity of residential solar
installations or their precise orientation; both of which impact the delicate,
instantaneous balance between the supply and demand of electric energy required to
maintain a stable electric grid.45
The “edge of the grid” taxonomy is also a reminder of the marginal role that
ratepayers have played since the beginning of the nation’s electrification—a role
limited to consumption of electricity often delivered by a monopoly-protected utility
company with nonnegotiable terms of service. Not until the 1990s did restructuring
set the stage for competition among load serving entities offering ratepayers a choice
among multiple suppliers and service plans.46 Even today, however, only sixteen
states offer retail choice to their ratepayers, leaving the majority of U.S. electricity
end users beholden to their local utility company.47
42

Eisen, Modern Electric Grid, supra note 38, at 421–22; Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136
S. Ct. at 782–83.
43
Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy
Storage, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 725–26 (2014).
44
See Roberts, supra note 9.
45
The challenge of balancing increasing amounts of DERs with other resources has
been vividly illustrated in an illustration known as the “duck chart,” for its unusual shape.
See CALIFORNIA INDEP. SYS. OP., WHAT THE DUCK CURVE TELLS US ABOUT MANAGING A
GREEN GRID 2–3 (2016), http://www.caiso.com/documents/flexibleresourceshelprenewable
s_fastfacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4BN-6JB].
46
Mathew J. Morey et al., Retail Choice in Electricity: What Have We Learned in 20
Years?, CHRISTENSEN ASSOC. ENERGY CONSULTING LLC 5 fig. 2 (2016).
47
While many residential consumers have switched electricity providers, switching
rates are still less than 50% in most states. Morey et al., supra note 46, at 5; Christina
Simeone & John Hanger, Kleinman, A Case Study of Electric Competition Results in
Pennsylvania, CTR. FOR ENERGY POL’Y 4 (2016). (switching rates of 22–46% for load
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Notwithstanding limitations in scope and availability, retail choice is critically
important as the only competitive environment of any sort for the vast majority of
residential consumers purchasing electricity.48 To be sure, a few pioneering
customers turned “prosumers” already participate in electricity markets, such as
those providing demand response.49 Others use net energy metering and similar
programs to revise the electric grid’s unidirectional narrative.50 Such entrepreneurial
ratepayers, however, make up a tiny fraction of total residential consumers; and a
growing, but still minor fraction, of commercial and industrial users. Historically,
large-scale commercial and industrial customers have had greater economic
leverage to negotiate and enter into advantageous contracts for purchasing power
from their utilities, but these customers, too, have little ability to sell power to
anyone but their local utility.
2. The Rationale for Free Trade in Electricity
The advantages of a system of free electricity trading are diverse and
numerous.51 This Article highlights the economic and grid management benefits.
From an economic perspective, an electricity trading ecosystem allows for proper
recognition and, ultimately, monetization of the electricity products and services that
DERs provide to the grid—with inadequate, if any, reward offered under the current
system. The second justification flows from acknowledging that the centralized
control architecture of today’s grid is unable to manage DERs. As these distributed
resources continue to proliferate, the grid requires an increasingly inclusive control
paradigm built with economic incentives for those who construct, upgrade, own, and
manage the assets necessary to maintain reliability of service in an increasingly
multidimensional grid.

serving utilities in Pennsylvania). But see Mormann et al., supra note 25, at 67 (reporting
switching rates of over 90% among Texas retail customers).
48
Studies differ on retail choice’s impacts on electricity rates. Compare SIMEONE &
HANGER, supra note 47 (saying prices decreased in Pennsylvania by 2–4% or more) with
Seth Blumsack et al., Electricity Prices and Costs Under Regulation and Restructuring,
ALFRED P. SLOAN FOUNDATION INDUSTRY STUDIES 1 (2008) http://web.mit.edu/is08/pdf/
Blumsack_Lave_Apt%20Sloan%20paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/54GY-TP6A] (saying prices
have increased on average by 2–3 cents per kWh). In any event, because retail choice
fundamentally differs from the system in mind, these studies are less relevant to a system of
free and multidimensional trade in electricity.
49
Eisen, Modern Electric Grid, supra note 38, at 426; Sharon B. Jacobs, The Energy
Prosumer, 43 ECOL. L.Q. 519, 523 (2017).
50
Revesz & Unel, supra note 30, at 67; Lincoln L. Davies & Sanya Carley, Emerging
Shadows in National Solar Policy? Nevada’s Net Metering Transition in Context, 30
ELECTRICITY J. 33 (Jan.-Feb. 2017).
51
See generally GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11.
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(a) Proper Valuation and Remuneration for Grid Assets
The new trading paradigm offers opportunities for utilities and third parties to
provide value-added services to customers and extend their business models beyond
the one-way provision of electricity that dominates today’s grid. Free trade for
electricity can support transactions among a wide variety of participants including
individuals, utilities, energy service companies (“ESCOs”), aggregators, and others
that can bundle and market electricity and related product offerings, such as energy
management services (including energy efficiency measures such as energy audits,
retrofits, and related services, and utility sponsored demand response). There are
substantial opportunities to use markets to capture value for participants with a
widely expanded menu of products and services, including those currently offered
by utilities and third parties plus experimental new offerings. New firms could enter
the industry and provide products and services.52 Innovators could develop discrete
applications, or bring together various functions in complementary ways,53 creating
synergies by bundling services and products.
To illustrate the plethora of possibilities, this section describes a nonexclusive
listing of three categories of business opportunities with the caveat that trading
structures will enable the development and deployment of even more innovative
business practices and opportunities over time. The first category includes
traditional staples of the electricity industry value chain, such as ownership and
operation of generating facilities, the sale of electricity and the provision of demandside energy management services. Incumbent utilities currently dominate this
category along with more recent market entries by merchant generators, wholesale
trading firms, and other third parties like demand response firms.54
The second category includes products and services that capitalize directly on
information derived in the context of electricity generation and delivery. The data
generated by smart meters, for example, can yield insights in energy efficiency and
other metrics that have monetary value.55 Some offerings, such as providing energy
trading services for participants in markets, are integrally tied to the purchase and
52

Utility of the Future: An MIT Energy Initiative Response to an Industry in Transition,
MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE 186 (2016), [hereinafter MIT Energy Initiative]
https://energy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Utility-of-the-Future-Full-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C5U2-ZRSP]. For illustrative examples, see Navigating the Energy
Transformation, NAVIGANT 9 (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.navigant.com/-/media/www/
site/insights/energy/2016/navigatingtheenergytransformation.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2G2JGEZ].
53
Navigating the Energy Transformation, supra note 52, at 14 (“As connected devices,
DER, intelligent buildings, and prosumers proliferate across the edge of the grid, it is only a
matter of time before an innovator leveraging ubiquitous digital connectivity, data
aggregation, and information exchange establishes itself within the industry.”).
54
Id.
55
Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Remaking Energy: The Critical Role of
Energy Consumption Data, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1095, 1110–11 (2016); Eisen, Smart
Regulation, supra note 7, at 12.
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sale of electricity.56 Others, such as energy efficiency measures, enhanced electric
vehicle charging, or energy equipment maintenance and financing are made possible
by capitalizing on information derived from its use.
Finally, a third category includes non-energy products such as security services
or home automation that could complement energy-related products or services.
Some utilities already offer products and services in the second and third categories,
under terms and conditions regulated by public utility commissions (“PUCs”) and,
in some instances, FERC.57 And nonutility firms are increasingly vying to capitalize
on these value streams, by aggregating one or more of them, or even inventing new
products and services.58
At present, firms other than utilities face barriers to the free exchange of their
goods and services. DER owners, for example, have limited opportunities to sell
electricity to third parties, while utilities can freely access markets and engage in
bilateral transactions when necessary to supplement market transactions.59
Nonutility firms are further disadvantaged by information asymmetries, as utilities
possess far greater knowledge about the actual costs and benefits of generating and
selling electricity from DERs than most of their customers.60 In light of these
informational disadvantages and other transaction costs, many would-be-sellers lack
the sophistication and inclination to deal with existing markets.61
56

Numerous firms already engage in electricity trading for utilities and others,
including subsidiaries of large investor owned utilities, affiliates of merchant generation
firms, and others. See, e.g., VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY ELECTRONIC DATA
INTERCHANGE (EDI), TRADING PARTNER AGREEMENT (May 5, 2010) https://www.dominion
energy.com/library/domcom/pdfs/business/csp-trading-partner-agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z54L-GQX5].
57
An example of FERC’s involvement in the second category is its oversight of marketbased rates for entities trading in electric power, which focuses on whether sellers possess
market power. Electric Market-Based Rates, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N,
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-info/mbr.asp [https://perma.cc/LPN7-MC7K]
(last updated Sept. 28, 2017).
58
See, e.g., MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 32; RICHARD TABORS ET AL.,
WHITE PAPER ON DEVELOPING COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND PRICING
STRUCTURES ES-1–ES-3 (2016), https://www.bu.edu/pcms/caramanis/NYPSC%20TCR%
20WhitepaperApril2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8C59-JJXP] (discussing opportunities in
distribution-level markets).
59
TABORS ET AL., supra note 58, at ES-6.
60
Order Adopting Regulatory Policy Framework and Implementation Plan, Case No.
14-M-0101: REV (Feb. 26, 2015) [hereinafter New York PSC Track One Framework Order]
(quoting Jean Tirole, Market Failures and Public Policy, Nobel Prize Lecture, Dec. 8, 2014).
61
Some potential participants with electricity available in sufficient quantities are
disinclined to become involved with the wholesale markets due to the complexity and
transaction costs. For example, municipal wastewater treatment facilities can produce
electricity from methane generated in the treatment process. Peter Fairley, Power to the
People, MIT TECH. REV. (May 1, 2001), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/400982/
power-to-the-people/ [https://perma.cc/F793-SC6K]. WATER RES. FDN., ENERGY PROJECTS
AT WATER RESOURCE AND RECLAMATION FACILITIES (forthcoming) (detailing the

2018]

FREE TRADE IN ELECTRIC POWER

65

Energy efficiency and other demand-side measures can dramatically reduce
power plant emissions at low cost, but most of that potential has yet to be realized.62
Energy service firms work to help customers achieve load reductions, but have not
captured the full range of available savings. For decades, they have struggled to
overcome market barriers relating to customer acquisition, technology integration,
scaling operations beyond individual customers, financing, and behavioral
challenges.63 In addition, state regulatory approaches often discourage investments
in demand-side measures,64 even though they are more cost efficient and less risky
than constructing new power plants.65 Properly designed markets can lower these
barriers by providing new opportunities for firms to connect with potential
customers.
Transparent markets that level the playing field between utility and nonutility
actors form the backbone of this power trading paradigm, giving buyers and sellers
the opportunity to offer valuable grid products and services in return for monetary
incentives. In simplest terms, fully functional markets can price all aspects of
generating, transporting, and consuming power across the system while maintaining,
protecting, and optimizing the delivery and consumption of electricity, and
deploying DERs as critical elements of the grid. From a microeconomic perspective,
market price signals can be the principal driver of determining how participants
derive economic value from transactions, and encouraging further industry
development.
Such a market-based trading ecosystem requires an architecture that encourages
recognition and optimization of all possible value streams, outlines the business
opportunities for participants, and spells out the interaction among all parties. This
structure would differ from the current grid’s limited markets in three fundamental
ways. First, it would encourage participation by a broad spectrum of actors,
including individual buyers and sellers as well as a range of new and existing firms.
Second, it would expand the portfolio of products and services traded on markets to
include innovative offerings. Finally, it would expand the types of transactions
beyond the limited set currently available.

reluctance of these facilities to navigate the complex requirements for wholesale market
trading.).
62
Jim Lazar & Ken Colburn, Recognizing the Full Value of Energy Efficiency, REG.
ASSISTANCE PROJECT (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.raponline.org/knowledgecenter/recognizing-the-full-value-of-energy-efficiency/ [https://perma.cc/D2S9-DBMD].
63
GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 25; Victor M. Hanna, Stop,
Think, Build, Repeat: Using Behavioral Economics to Better Design Energy Efficiency
Policies for Our Cities’ Buildings, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 241, 289–90 (2014).
64
Eisen, Modern Electric Grid, supra note 38, at 369–71 (describing the “throughput
incentive” and its impact on discouraging demand-side investments).
65
How Much Does Energy Efficiency Cost?, AM. COUN. FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT
ECON. 1, http://aceee.org/sites/default/files/cost-of-ee.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7QS-A38Y]
(finding that energy efficiency program costs are “substantially less than the cost of meeting
electricity needs with new power plants”).

66

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

This framework contemplates an increasingly decentralized siting of grid
assets. Economists studying industrial organization increasingly suggest that the
innovative characteristics of DERs change the size and location of optimal firms in
the electricity sector.66 Thus, the proliferation of DERs along the edge of the grid
allows their owners to emancipate themselves somewhat from the stranglehold of
local utilities.67 The operational characteristics of DERs, particularly the opportunity
for multidirectional interaction among actors through the use of digital
communications technologies, reduce transaction costs and create economies of
scale that decrease the economic incentives for vertical integration.68 As the
proliferation of markets lowers transaction costs, “transactive activity should shift
at the margin from within firm to between firm, and firm boundaries should
change.”69
(b) A More Inclusive Control Paradigm
DER growth is challenging the widespread assumption that the centralized
system of physically managing the grid is necessary and sufficient to maintain grid
stability and reliability. “Edge of the grid” sounds like a frontier without concrete
rules of interaction. To a large extent, it is. But the “edge” marks no fixed boundary,
and not all DERs are located at the grid’s outermost points. The growing penetration
of DERs fosters both increasing two-way communication, and nonlinear interactions
among devices.70 As DERs become more interconnected to the grid, they need to be
considered integral and interactive parts of it. Yet, utility control systems
accustomed to unidirectional flow of electricity tend to treat them more like
appendices.
Control systems originally designed for one-way flow are not up to the task of
incorporating DERs and maintaining stable grid operations. Already, there are too
many DERs online, acting too quickly for real-time management to be possible in
most instances.71 The rapid deployment of DERs will exacerbate this, and soon,
devices at the grid’s edge will overwhelm the distribution system’s ability to manage
them.72
66

Kiesling, supra note 11.
Most owners of DERs continue to rely on the electric grid and utility supplied power
when their in house generation is insufficient to meet their electricity needs. See Revesz &
Unel, supra note 30, at 3 (noting that “distributed solar customers may depend on utility
supplied power to supplement or meet their usage sixteen hours a day”).
68
Kiesling, supra note 11, at 8.
69
Id. at 22.
70
GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 5.
71
Id. at iii.
72
By one estimate, this would happen once DERs make up 30% of total grid capacity.
Id. (at this point “the current control systems for the grid will be simply inadequate”). For an
individual utility’s perspective, see The Emerging Clean Energy Economy, SO. CALIF.
EDISON
(Sept.
2016),
http://www.edison.com/content/dam/eix/documents/ourperspective/der-dso-white-paper-final-201609.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GWY-X6DL].
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There must be some other means of managing a grid comprised of both
traditional generation and DERs. Therefore, an electricity trading ecosystem must
not only establish the economic foundation of markets in goods and services, but
must also carefully specify the technical details of the interaction among parties.
This Article proposes a new operational paradigm for grid control in which multiple
parties—generators, markets, DER owners, and aggregators, as well as grid
operators—engage in discovery and management of grid devices.73 The
convergence of expanded data management capabilities, sophisticated analytic
models, cloud computing, and ubiquitous connectivity can accelerate the
development of this infrastructure. In particular, technologies and standards
currently under development to facilitate multi-device, multi-party data exchange
make it possible to contemplate distributed physical balancing and control, rather
than centralized utility control.
In the near future, society could see a grid that eschews fully centralized control
for “a loosely coupled set of controls with just enough information exchange to allow
for stability and global optimization through local action.”74 This more distributed
approach, which folds the combination of grid economics and grid controls into an
engineering and economics framework, is one of the hallmarks of this framework,
combined with regulatory models, discussed below, that are tailored to the locus of
innovation to the greatest extent possible.
B. Core Interactions in an Electricity Trading Ecosystem
A fully developed electricity trading ecosystem should enable a wide range of
energy-related trades and transactions among a large and diverse set of actors. For a
better structural understanding, the various transactions are classified based on the
products and services traded, the parties involved, and the types of transactions. In
addition to its taxonomic value, this tripartite classification serves as the backdrop
for identifying crucial questions that need to be addressed before the current utility
centric electricity system can make way for the future.
The term “markets” is used to describe three different aspects of the ecosystem:
the regional wholesale electricity markets, which this proposal retains; the new state
markets, which would facilitate many interactions that are expected to take place;
and the overall character of the ecosystem as market-based. With that understanding
in mind, the next section now turns to describing the products and services, actors,
and transactions that constitute this electricity trading ecosystem.
73

GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 8–9 (contemplating a “more
distributed kind of control” over the electric grid, providing a map of distributed system
control using DERs and other resources, calling it “joint market and control functionality.”).
Compare LORENZO KRISTOV & PAUL DEMARTINI, CALTECH RESNICK INST., 21ST CENTURY
ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM OPERATIONS 1 (May 2014), http://resnick.caltech.edu/docs
/21st.pdf [https://perma.cc/NV8C-9BAH]. (describing an “integrated distributed electricity
system” where “energy sources and operating decisions will be broadly decentralized and
localized”); MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 35.
74
GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 10.
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1. Products and Services
No listing of products and services would be complete without reference to
existing regional wholesale markets.75 In these markets, energy-related products and
services are traded in many different ways. In its most traditional form, electric
energy is bought and sold in kWh or MWh, i.e., as a function of electrical output or
consumption over a specified period of time.76 Electricity is often traded in forward
transactions, with generators offering to supply electricity for intervals of five
minutes or longer on a day ahead basis.77 If all goes as planned, on the following
day, the generator delivers the promised amount of electricity as contracted for the
day before. If the generator fails to deliver as promised, it has to compensate its
counterparty based on their imbalance settlement for the balancing services required
to make up for its shortfall.78 These balancing services differ from the default energy
product by virtue of their short-term availability.79
Maintaining the electric grid’s delicate balance requires the continuous
matching of fluctuating demand with corresponding supply and frequent
interventions to maintain voltage and frequency within a specified range.80 Voltage
and frequency regulation are examples of “ancillary services” already traded in
wholesale markets to ensure the grid’s stability and compatibility with appliances
and other load off-takers.
More recently, concerns over sufficient reserve capacity to meet demand spikes
in summer heat spells and other extreme weather events have prompted parts of the
country to also trade energy by “capacity.”81 Here, parties do not (yet) contract for
all or part of the electricity to be generated by one, or multiple, power plant(s) of a
certain capacity. Instead, generators are remunerated for ensuring the availability of
a certain output capacity for a set future period of time—the energy economy’s
equivalent of a retainer fee for attorneys.82

75

Hammond & Spence, supra note 24. See also Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC,
136 S. Ct. 1288, 1290–93 (2016) (describing the clearing process for bids into the wholesale
market of the PJM interconnect).
76
Electric Power Annual 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (2016),
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf [https://perma.cc/XCV9-8HS4].
77
Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 5, at 1656. Cf. Corinna Klessmann
et al., Pros and Cons of Exposing Renewables to Electricity Market Risks—A Comparison of
the Market Integration Approaches in Germany, Spain, and the UK, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 3646,
3647 (2008) (discussing market risks of renewable energy producers in Germany, Spain, and
the United Kingdom).
78
Mormann, Renewables Revolution, supra note 3, at 923.
79
Id.
80
Klessman et al., supra note 77, at 3647 (“The power system can only function in a
stable manner if supply and demand are continuously balanced.”).
81
See, e.g., Joseph Bowring, Capacity Markets in PJM, 2 ECON. ENERGY & ENVTL.
POL’Y 47, 64 (2013).
82
Rossi, supra note 15, at 424 n.145.
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Thus, wholesale markets across the nation differ both in terms of the products
traded—capacity vs. electric energy vs. ancillary services—and in their temporal
dimension—forward vs. spot markets. Whatever their product and timeline, these
markets use standardized terms and conditions for all but the price which markets
set as a function of demand and supply.83 The new power trading paradigm should
offer a framework for the continued provision of these energy-related products and
services, individually or in whatever combination most appeals to the specific
markets and their participants.
Going forward, the same framework can accommodate and foster the creation
of novel markets for products and services previously not contemplated or
technologically available, while also lowering barriers for new entrants into existing
markets. Already, energy conservation and efficiency play a limited role in markets
(occasionally providing ancillary services), as some pioneering jurisdictions begin
to harness the power of aggregating intermittent renewable generators to offer higher
value balancing services as opposed to, or in addition to, standard electricity sales.84
Similarly, recent advances in batteries and other energy storage technologies have
made it possible for these facilities to provide both energy and ancillary services.85
2. Actors
The new power trading paradigm builds on continued participation of the actors
that shape today’s energy system, including electric utilities, merchant generators,
grid operators, and large-scale industrial and commercial customers. While these
constituencies should and will remain involved in an electricity trading ecosystem,
their relative importance may change.
Utilities will likely become less dominant than they are today.86 Regardless of
whether it is investor owned, municipally owned, or a rural electric cooperative, the
utility of the future will cease to be the central hub of the electricity sector. Instead,
nonutility actors—both old and new—will move closer to center stage. Merchant
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generators87 will continue to gain influence as the number of potential buyers for
their output and available transaction formats increase. Aggregators and brokers of
DERs will harness the multiplicity of new sales and distribution channels to assume
a greater role.88 As guardians of the grid, ISOs and RTOs are also likely to see their
mandates and responsibilities grow in scope and complexity.89 ESCOs and other
service providers would become more important market participants. Finally,
energy-intensive industrial and commercial electricity customers who already use
their financial and business acumen to negotiate their own rates and other terms for
electricity and related services will experience an upgrade to their market position
and options.90
Perhaps the most transformative impact of free trade in electricity, however,
will be the introduction of new classes and empowerment of previously
marginalized classes of actors through enhanced market access. Thus, households
with rooftop solar will no longer be required to sell or net meter their output to their
local utility based on take-it-or-leave-it rates and terms. Instead, these prosumers
will now have the ability, subject to certain technical constraints,91 to choose from
among a variety of competing buyers and transaction formats. Even traditional
consumers of electricity, without their own generation capacity, can participate in
markets that support a range of competing business models. These could include
emerging but not yet fully deployed time-of-use pricing models, energy
management services, or prepaid plans that allow ratepayers to lock in a specific rate
but offer the potential for resale of any surplus, similar to the “rollover” minutes
offered under cellphone plans.92
Finally, the new wealth of actors and transactions will likely attract more and
more energy traders. Their notorious role in the California energy crisis underscores
the need for a proactively developed regulatory regime that guides the transition to
the future and avoids the market manipulation and other mistakes that have marred
and, in many places, stalled restructuring of the electricity sector.93
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3. Transactions
The multiplicity of transactions can be separated into four categories depending
on the extent to which either or both of the parties to a specific transaction is
principally involved in the business of making and selling electricity or related
products and services. These transactions are categorized by the character of their
origination and destination, regardless of any intermediate steps necessary to
consummate them, such as the operation of a market. The first category, termed
“business to business” (“B2B”) involves transactions where both parties are
professional buyers and sellers. An example would be the sale of electricity from a
merchant generator to an electric utility. A second category, “business to consumer”
(“B2C”), refers to transactions where a professional firm sells to end users, such as
the sale of electricity by a utility to its customers. The third category, “consumer to
business” (“C2B”), includes sales from consumers94 to professional firms. An
example of a C2B transaction would be a homeowner selling the excess output of
her rooftop solar installation to the local utility.95 Finally, the Article envisions a
category of interaction heretofore unknown, “consumer to consumer” (“C2C”), that
involves transactions between nonprofessional sellers and buyers of electricity and
related services. A typical C2C transaction would be the sale of rooftop solar
generated electricity from one neighbor to another.
Classifying a transaction as B2B, B2C, C2B, or C2C matters for a variety of
reasons, including the applicable contractual regime. A C2C transaction would
likely be governed by common law principles, but some courts would apply the
Uniform Commercial Code to B2B, B2C, and C2B transactions.96 The various types
of transactions also differ markedly in their availability, structure, and access to
competitive markets. At one end of the spectrum, B2B trades have a long history
and are well established both in the form of bilateral contracts and, more recently,
as the result of competitive bidding processes on wholesale power markets. At the
other end of the spectrum, C2C transactions are virtually nonexistent, lacking both
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an established regime of bilateral contracts and, critically, access to competitive
market platforms.
Free trade in electricity would encompass a greatly expanded range of
transactions—both on markets and in bilateral trading constellations that would
cease to be the exclusive domain of B2B transactions. In addition, it would facilitate
a much wider variety of B2B, B2C, and C2C transactions in electricity and related
products and services such as energy management. And this section contemplates a
multitude of virtual transactions related to electricity, such as put or call options to
hedge against the risk of unusual price fluctuations.
(a) B2B Transactions
In the early days of electrification, B2B transactions were few and far between.
Electricity providers were vertically integrated—selling and delivering the power
they generated to customers using their own, often insular distribution networks.97
When these networks eventually merged to form larger interconnects, utilities were
able to use this transmission infrastructure to buy power from one another. The
industry’s vertical integration and prevailing cost-of-service regulation,98 however,
limited such B2B transactions to rare instances where one utility turned to another
to meet unusually high demand from its customers.99
Even after enactment of the 1935 Federal Power Act (“FPA”), B2B trades of
electricity remained relatively uncommon, and limited to bilateral contracts between
utilities.100 B2B transactions with nonutility participation did not take off until the
1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”) opened the door for a new
class of merchant generators101 by exempting them from burdensome utility
regulation while requiring local utilities to purchase their power output.102 Finally,
the greatest catalyst of B2B transactions in the electricity sector came in the form of
a series of rulemaking initiatives by FERC that resulted in the creation of wholesale
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power markets.103 While bilateral contracts continue to play an important role,104
competitive wholesale markets have replaced FERC regulation of individual
transactions as the norm in two-thirds of the United States.105 This new power
trading paradigm builds on and expands the role of competitive wholesale markets
by inviting trade of novel products among new market entrants, such as the
renewable power offered by DER aggregators.
(b) B2C Transactions
Today, the quintessential B2C transaction is a load-serving utility’s sale of
electricity to its customers, regulated for nearly a century by state PUCs.106 These
transactions are executed through bilateral contracts, even where ratepayers have a
choice among various retail electricity providers. Growing competition among
retailers in parts of the country has increased both the number and nature of customer
options. But pricing and other terms remain subject to generally non-negotiable,
103
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boilerplate provisions. Even in states with retail choice, B2C transactions today look
nothing like the B2B transactions on wholesale markets where prices are set by
demand and supply. Yet, ratepayers with retail choice demonstrate a surprising
mobility in switching from one retail provider to another, suggesting a level of
customer engagement sufficient to drive more competitive markets for B2C
transactions.107 The vision of free trade for electricity would foster the development
of these markets.
(c) C2B Transactions
The recent proliferation of smaller-scale, customer-sited distributed generation
assets has created a new type of transaction where a consumer-turned-prosumer of
electricity sells the (excess) output of her installation to the local utility. To date,
such C2B transactions are limited in a number of ways. In most jurisdictions,
prosumers are at the mercy of a monopsony buyer—their local utility.108
Furthermore, many jurisdictions structure the C2B relationship using net energy
metering programs that limit the amount a prosumer can sell.109 While the feed-in
tariff programs, recently adopted by a few pioneering states and utilities, eliminate
this cap,110 they too, prevent prosumers from capturing the full value of their output,
as remuneration rates tend to be flat and not time sensitive. In a 2010 decision, FERC
endorsed feed-in tariff rates set under PURPA that include adders or bonus payments
for transmission and distribution upgrade costs that a utility avoids as the result of
distributed generation assets.111 To date, however, no feed-in tariff (expressly)
considers and rewards the benefits of DERs related to transmission and distribution
network congestion relief.
(d) C2C Transactions
The most novel category of transactions envisioned connects nonprofessional
buyers and sellers of electricity-related products and services. To date, there is no
contractual framework or market platform to facilitate C2C transactions such as the
sale of rooftop solar electricity from one residential ratepayer to another. Yet, such
local trades offer obvious benefits in terms of providing critical relief to increasingly
107
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congested transmission and distribution networks. As the portfolio of DERs
continues to grow and diversify, C2C transactions will allow for more efficient siting
and pooling of resources among nonprofessional but increasingly energy-savvy
consumers and prosumers of electricity.
Imagine two neighbors, one with a roof structure and orientation that are
perfectly suited for solar panels and another whose roof is not solar compatible but
who has plenty of excess space in her basement. Or think of the California hippie
who sells battery-stored power produced by his commune’s solar farm out of the
back of his VW bus at the local farmers’ market. Under the current regime, only the
latter, outside-the-grid transaction would be possible even though the former
promises to be more efficient and easier to scale. A well developed framework for
C2C transactions would allow both homeowners to join forces using the first
neighbor’s roof to generate solar electricity and the second neighbor’s basement for
installation of storage batteries.
4. New State Markets
This Article proposes the establishment of new state-level markets as the
default venue for C2C transactions. These markets should be structured as
“platforms,” comparable to those of Uber and Airbnb, which have emerged in a
variety of industries to match buyers and sellers. Jean Tirole, the founding father of
platform economics,112 defines a platform as a market where the specific price
structure presents opportunities to each side of the market to increase overall utility
and overcome transaction costs.113 Platforms differ from other markets in that they
provide a place for customers to discover each other and conduct transactions, with
common ground rules that aim to create network effects by reducing transaction
costs of interaction and increasing market liquidity.114 Platforms come in various
112
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shapes and the nature of connections among participants varies widely. Software or
standards that promote innovation, such as Google’s suite of applications, are one
version of a platform.115 Transaction platforms—including financial markets,
auction houses, and other exchanges that reduce the transaction costs of matching
buyers and sellers—are another.116
Economists term platforms “multisided” markets117 because they can have
more than two different types of users,118 and because their users are interdependent.
In transactional platforms, users make economically advantageous matches with
each other through mediated trading systems designed to overcome the externalities
that present barriers to buyers and sellers from discovering and trading with one
another.119 At times, they may be buyers, and at other times (perhaps even
overlapping) sellers. Consider the Airbnb participant who owns and rents a property
in one city but also visits other cities, using Airbnb to rent spaces there.
Platforms create value for their participants by generating both direct and
indirect network effects. Direct network effects result from increasing scale: as the
platform attracts more users, others find the prospect of using it more attractive,
resulting in a cycle of continuing growth.120 This is a phenomenon well known to
anyone familiar with Facebook or Twitter, for instance. Indirect network effects
result where platform users on one side attract more on the other.121 As discussed
below, design and implementation choices can promote or hinder the ability to
efficiently match buyers and sellers in the market, and the development of network
effects.122
In keeping with the pertinent literature, this Article proposes a specific form of
transactional platform: electricity exchanges open to new forms of interaction, to
novel products and services, and to a broad spectrum of new participants. Properly
designed and implemented, these exchanges could reduce transaction costs and
catalyze positive externalities, such as more widespread product diffusion and
115
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attendant benefits. Widespread access to platform power markets could, therefore,
accelerate the deployment of solar power (and help reduce carbon emissions) as well
as dissemination of energy efficiency products and services.
Unique characteristics of electricity and the grid make it ripe for a wholesale
shift to exchanges. Electricity is extremely suitable for trading. Because any unit of
electricity is indistinguishable from any other, it is possible to accomplish most
transactions virtually with assumed contractual paths. This fungibility also
distinguishes electricity from water or spare living space. And settlement could be
quicker than in auctions where buyers receive physical goods, assuming proper
measurement and verification protocols for suppliers. Better yet, the platform would
require no new backbone infrastructure, as one already exists: the physical grid. The
rapid proliferation of digital technologies, meanwhile, offers support for a large and
growing number of market interactions. This kind of technology-driven change to
the industry’s organizational structure has, in fact, been a central aspect of its
evolution for decades.123
Setting up these exchanges will be no easy task, given potential (and likely)
conflicts with the grid’s existing physical and organizational structure, especially
where incumbent monopoly rights are at stake.124 In the near term, the exchanges
should be built to latch onto an existing system of generating and distributing
electricity, with actors who might not support them and will likely use their political
clout to oppose them. New markets that are developed using existing infrastructure
and pursuant to existing institutional arrangements further carry the risk that
impediments from incumbent actors may cause critical linkages to develop in
suboptimal fashion and require adjustments later. Still, the potential benefits are
such that they warrant the effort necessary to resolve these and other growing pains
along the way to free trade for electric power.
II. DESIGN GOALS AND PRINCIPLES
Having explained the rationale and concept of an ecosystem that facilitates free
trade for electricity, this Part now turns to fundamental design principles. In light of
the multitude of vested interests, legacy infrastructure, and deeply entrenched
incumbents, it would be naïve to presume that the new power trading paradigm can
start with a clean slate. Fortunately, much progress can be made by combining
existing facilities and institutions with new legal arrangements. Rather than calling
for a radical (and unlikely) revolution, this framework represents the next stage of
evolution for the electricity system put in place well over a century ago.
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This Part specifies a set of foundational principles intended to strike a careful
balance between encouraging innovation, unlocking free trade for electricity, and
avoiding substantial near-term disturbances in the industry. It begins with a handful
of foundational building blocks, followed by a set of more specific design principles
that shape this framework.
A. Core Ecosystem Goals
Five core goals advance the concept of free trade in electricity while respecting
the limitations of today’s system. They are as follows: a competitive trading
environment with low barriers to entry; an evolutionary, not revolutionary, approach
to moving toward the future; agnosticism about which business model is most likely
to achieve full trading; matching the scale and institutional locus of regulation with
the most meaningful impacts on the electricity sector; and, finally, recognition of
and sensitivity to shifting jurisdictional boundaries.
First, a high priority is placed on the overarching goal of promoting
anywhere/anytime transactions. Any policy that purports to transform the electricity
industry should be able to answer the following basic questions. How will the policy
lead to networking? How will it facilitate the cornucopia of transactions that would
take place in a fully functioning free trade ecosystem? How will it promote
opportunities for innovators to be part of the ecosystem and create value? How will
such a policy create access points for consumers that replace today’s often byzantine
access requirements125 with a more inviting and user-friendly regime?
Second, implementation of the new power trading paradigm will need to follow
an evolutionary, not revolutionary, approach.126 Without electricity, modern life
would be almost impossible. Revamping the grid entirely all at once would have
numerous implications for security and reliability. Replacing the existing business
model from one day to the next with an untested model would jeopardize the current
system’s financial stability. Recent history in the industry also counsels in favor of
caution. Those who remember how California’s experiment with the CalPX power
exchange crashed and burned will be wary of turning the distribution system over to
market forces.127 This approach retains many elements of the existing grid, such as
the wholesale markets. Evolutionary progress does not require that all policy
building blocks be developed immediately. Still, some major decisions will need to
be made in the here and now, and those early decisions will inevitably determine
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much of what will transpire later. Proper implementation, finally, will require
constant monitoring and, where necessary, retooling of the system as it develops.
Third, the legal framework underlying the new trading paradigm should
encourage experimentation within the grid’s physical, legal, and market architecture.
Rather than pick winners and losers, it is imperative to avoid ex ante decisions about
which technology or business model will succeed. To facilitate the greatest possible
range of innovation, market entrants who wish to promote alternatives to incumbent
utilities should not be unduly hampered in their efforts. To this end, policymakers
can expand on recent market-building initiatives by FERC and their express
endorsement by the Supreme Court.128 The optimal way to accommodate these
competing preferences is to create new opportunities to deliver products and
services, and to extend equally to all, the means to develop them. Notwithstanding
the need for and value of such an open-access approach, the new framework must
also recognize the needs of incumbent utilities and the existing legal mandates that
affect them.
Fourth, regulation of innovation at the edge of the grid should correspond to its
locus to the greatest extent possible. Scale matching has long been a staple of classic
federalism theory.129 Under this approach, issues of multilevel regulation are
commonly resolved in favor of whatever level of government is capable of
internalizing most of the costs and benefits associated with regulatory action.130
Presumably, superior policies and regulation emerge when decision makers are in a
position to consider and weigh all relevant costs and benefits.131 Notwithstanding
the theoretic appeal of classic federalism theory’s approach to multilevel governance
questions, recent scholarship has raised concerns over the matching principle’s
ability to accommodate the multitude of costs and benefits inherent in all regulatory
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See Eisen, FERC v. EPSA, supra note 41, at 5.
See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1498
(1994) (noting that state regulation has historically been defended as a way of adapting law
to local conditions and tastes, with national regulation thought necessary to prevent attempts
by states to impose costs on each other).
130
See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1210, 1222 (1992) (describing the presence of interstate externalities as a “powerful reason
for intervention at the federal level”); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems
of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86
YALE L.J. 1196, 1215–16 (1977) (discussing various types of spillover effects); Thomas W.
Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 932 (1997)
(characterizing transboundary pollution as a “clear case for shifting regulatory authority from
local to more centralized levels of governance”).
131
See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996). See also David E. Adelman, Environmental Federalism When
Numbers Matter More Than Size, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 238, 308 (2014)
(explaining that “[f]or the classical school, the primary consideration is whether regulatory
agencies internalize the environmental costs and benefits of their policies.”).
129
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action.132 Any regulation triggering even remote effects felt beyond the regulator’s
jurisdictional reach would, under the traditional scale matching approach, call for
action by a higher level of government.133
DERs and other technology innovation at the edge of the grid illustrate the
dilemma of regulatory scale matching. As more efficient consumption patterns and
locally generated electricity from solar, wind, and other renewable sources reduce
the need for carbon intensive fossil-fueled power plants, they help mitigate global
climate change. Maximum internalization of these benefits would, therefore, suggest
regulatory action at the highest possible level of government—national or, better
yet, international. Positive climate impacts are, however, but one of many impacts
of technological advances at the edge of the grid. Other environmental benefits, such
as those related to cleaner air and water conservation, manifest themselves on a more
localized scale.134 Moving from environmental to economic impacts, benefits related
to fewer grid congestion issues and costs thanks to greater efforts to preserve grid
reliability with intermittent resources accrue primarily at a local level.135 Together,
these and other smaller scale impacts suggest the state, rather than regional or
federal, forum as the ideal locus for much of the regulation required to unleash free
trade in electric power.
Finally, while the change proposed is dramatic, the authors are mindful of the
constraints on this approach imposed by the long-settled division of jurisdictional
authority between federal and state regulators, even if the precise contours of that
boundary are in flux. The purpose of an energy-related trade (whether an acquisition
is for end-use or resale) or its geographic scope (transmission across state boundaries
or distribution across the street) will decide whether that transaction is subject to
federal or state jurisdiction.136
The difficulties of ascertaining the dividing line between state and federal
jurisdiction are well known, and have prompted numerous suggestions for reform.137
132

Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 5, at 1673 (cautioning against the
matching principle’s historical tendency to focus primarily, if not exclusively, on the toplevel, farthest reaching impacts of policy issues, at the expense of other, more localized but
no less critical impacts and considerations).
133
Id. at 1674–76.
134
See, e.g., Jonathan Levy & Jack Spengler, Health Benefits of Emissions Reductions
from Older Power Plants, 9 RISK IN PERSPECTIVE 1, 3 (2001).
135
Mormann, State Climate Policy Innovation, supra note 15, at 234.
136
Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority, supra note 15, at 1788–89 (discussing the
history of FPA provisions that draw a line between “wholesale” jurisdiction subject to federal
regulation, and “retail” jurisdiction subject to regulation by the states).
137
Many, including us, advocate for addressing the jurisdictional quagmire that has
hampered innovation in the electricity industry in recent years. See, e.g., Eisen, FERC’s
Expansive Authority, supra note 15, at 1781; Rossi, supra note 15, at 400–01; Robert R.
Nordhaus, The Hazy “Bright Line”: Defining Federal and State Regulation of Today’s
Electric Grid, 36 ENERGY L.J. 203, 213–15 (2015) (discussing the current regulatory division
of the electric power industry and reviewing options for needed changes); Hannah J.
Wiseman, Moving Past Dual Federalism to Advance Electric Grid Neutrality, 100 IOWA L.
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Regulatory reform should do much more than replace the traditional model of costof-service ratemaking with a market-based regime. Because the flow of electricity
transcends state and other jurisdictional boundaries,138 regulatory reform will
eventually need to address a mismatch in geographic scale.139 That mismatch
resulted from a mix of federal and state policies that apply distinctions from the past
to regulate wholesale and retail markets, resource control systems, transmission and
distribution control systems, and customer energy management systems.140
Some commentators argue for a stronger federal role in electricity regulation,
and these arguments are bolstered by recent Supreme Court decisions.141 Others
would envision a new form of hybrid regulation involving both levels of
government.142 For now, however, take the division of authority as it stands and aim
to minimize jurisdictional tension, as abrupt shifts in the distribution of authority
would delay or block its implementation. As described in greater detail below, the
more straightforward approach to interpreting “wholesale” and “retail” would
reduce jurisdictional difficulties, not add to them.
B. Specific Design Principles
With these overarching goals in mind, this section now turns to more specific
features of this approach. There are seven core attributes of the new power trading
paradigm.
1. Grid-Centered Development
Fundamentally, this approach is grid-centered, building on the existing electric
grid’s infrastructure, not some other physical network that might someday replace
it. This approach does not envision “high-end disruption,”143 or full replacement of
the current grid in the near term by an alternative means of delivering electricity to
end users. This may disappoint those who propose innovative and creative ways in
which other firms could deliver electricity, but the more pragmatic approach

REV. BULL. 97, 105–08 (2015) (arguing that regulation of the electric power industry is done
best through a collaborative effort by private actors, states, and regional entities).
138
Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority, supra note 15, at 1788.
139
GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 5.
140
Id.
141
Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority, supra note 15, at 1788.
142
See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72
MD. L. REV. 773, 776 (2013).
143
Juan Pablo Vazquez Sampere, Why Platform Disruption Is So Much Bigger than
Product Disruption, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 8, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/04/why-platformdisruption-is-so-much-bigger-than-product-disruption
[https://perma.cc/D56R-LHFH]
(stating that high end disruption is “entering the market with a product or platform that is
superior to incumbents’ offerings”).
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recognizes certain undeniable realities of the electric utility industry,144 where highend disruption is hardly imminent, and change has always been, and will likely
continue to be, more incremental than in other industries.
For all the clamor that this is an industry on the cusp of disruption, it is not.
Some foresee a “new energy network,” or an “energy cloud,” or some alchemical
“orchestrator” spinning a network out of a combination of new technologies.145 But
for electricity distribution, this is mere talk. The potential disruptor of this industry
neither exists today nor is it on the horizon. Unlike, say, Uber and Airbnb, which
deliver service through alternate distribution channels, this industry still largely
depends on monopoly control of a single physical wire to a customer’s premises.
High-end disruptions are expensive, and electricity distribution with its natural
monopoly characteristics would be no different. Electric power distribution systems
are extremely capital-intensive to build and maintain, so it is unlikely that anyone
will duplicate the existing ones. And the few entities with other means of physical
access to residential premises (cable companies, for example) would need to engage
in considerable—and costly—retooling of their infrastructure to become credible
competitors.
In the near to medium term, it is hard to imagine the emergence of any
technologically and commercially viable alternative to today’s system of electricity
distribution. Some promising business models, such as microgrids, would lead to
physical cord cutting. At the current scale and pace of these experiments, however,
it would be many years before large numbers of consumers could survive on their
own without their incumbent distribution utilities. Wireless transmission of electric
energy, which could theoretically bypass incumbent utilities and their monopoly
over distribution wires, may be ready to charge cell phone batteries over minimal
distances. But, for now, wireless routing of electricity remains an elusive dream at
the scale and distance required to power households, let alone commercial and
industrial enterprises. The promising combination of solar panels and storage is not
yet ready to replace the distribution system either.146 In sum, it is an enormous and
unwarranted leap of faith to imagine a technologically and commercially viable
alternative to today’s electricity distribution system emerging any time soon.

144
For another example of pragmatism in approaching complex issues in the electric
utility industry (in this case, the “stranded costs” that result during and after major regulatory
shifts), see Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82
BROOK. L. REV. 645, 645–47 (2017).
145
See, e.g., Navigating the Energy Transformation, supra note 52, at 13–14
(discussing a potential electricity “orchestrator”).
146
Widespread availability of these systems is still in the future without a standardized
means of financing and installation. See Felix Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits: Smarter Tax
Policy for a Cleaner, More Democratic Energy Future, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 303, 360–61
(2014) [hereinafter Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits] (arguing that the current reliance on
nonrefundable tax credits to finance solar, wind, and other renewables impedes more
widespread participation in the deployment of renewable energy technologies); Eisen,
Residential Renewable Energy, supra note 13, at 339.
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Fortunately, a new trading paradigm can be achieved within the limits of
today’s electricity infrastructure, adding, for example, a platform trading
architecture for C2C transactions. Surely in some instances, new components will
need to be added to the existing physical network to improve its capabilities or
access to it.147 In many situations, would-be-participants not currently on the
distribution system will need new or upgraded physical connections. The continuing
proliferation of distributed solar and other DERs at the edge of the grid illustrates
that, with proper economic incentives and regulatory frameworks in place, the
existing grid is perfectly capable of delivering these and other connectivity upgrades.
2. Open Access to and for All Participants
The new power trading paradigm is premised upon granting open,
nondiscriminatory access to the electric grid and the economic opportunities it
provides.148 At present, numerous barriers to entry prevent more widespread
participation of individuals and nonutility entities in the energy economy. For
example, monopoly-protected distribution utilities may prevent potential
competitors from using their wires. Changing this would require permission to use
their systems, and, in many cases, development of new technologies or processes for
enabling access, or refinement of those already existing.149 Open access requires
more than a commitment to enabling access: it requires defining the terms and
conditions of open market interactions among participants.150 This may necessitate
a positive definition of “open access,” or, as proposed, model conditions for open
access paired with a market structure that facilitates it.
147

See, e.g., Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E), A 16-09-001(Sept. 1, 2016)
(utility Southern California Edison’s application in its 2018 general rate case, to justify rate
recovery of $2.2 billion in distribution grid modernization and technology costs in
conjunction with a potential transformation into a distribution system operator). See also The
Emerging
Clean Energy Economy, SO. CALI. EDISON
(Sept.
2016),
http://www.edison.com/content/dam/eix/documents/our-perspective/der-dso-white-paperfinal-201609.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GWY-X6DL]; Response of the Solar Energy Industries
Ass’n, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, A 16-09-001 (Oct. 3, 2016), at 4 (questioning, inter alia,
“whether these costs would have been incurred in the absence of DERs”).
148
MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 53 (calling for a “level playing field” for
DERs, “regardless of the structure of ownership and control” and specifying that this
“requires a neutral market platform to facilitate all commercial transactions”).
149
CAL. INDEP. SYS. OP. CORP., DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCE PROVIDER
INITIATIVE, ER16-1085-000, Mar. 4, 2016 [hereinafter CAISO DER AGGREGATION TARIFF
AMENDMENT PROPOSAL] at 3. One example of the technologies and processes that would
need to change for nondiscriminatory access to the grid is some means of making relevant
data more widely available. MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 199 (discussing the
idea of a “data hub”); see infra Part IV (discussing privacy concerns with more accessible
customer data).
150
Joel B. Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff: Removing Barriers to Innovation
on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1712, 1724–26 (2014) (discussing an “open access
distribution tariff” to define these terms and conditions).
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Grid access for nonutility actors should be nondiscriminatory access that
requires utilities to carry the resources of other firms without preference to their own
resources. To maintain the grid’s physical and financial health, the utilities’
obligation to grant open and nondiscriminatory access should be accompanied by a
compensation scheme, such as a transaction fee, a fixed charge for use of distribution
wires, or a combination of both.151
3. State-Level Platform Markets: The “Airbnb” of Electricity
This Article proposes a framework for trading that empowers transactions
among individuals, businesses, and aggregators that bundle distributed resources.
As noted above, the authors envision a multidimensional system of platform markets
in individual states that supports the broadest possible group of purchasers and
sellers, including C2C transactions.152
An exhaustive treatment of the burgeoning literature on the economics of
trading platforms is beyond the scope of this Article. Accordingly, the following
discussion focuses on a few key characteristics of platform economics and how they
can help foster free trade for electricity. Exchanges have a “triangulated” structure
in which one or more intermediaries must facilitate users’ transactions,153 serving as
their primary point of contact with the platform. The literature separates platforms
into those with open and closed ownership structures; in the former, the platform
sponsor and participants establish structures and rules, and any restrictions on
participation are uniformly applied;154 in the latter, a single provider operates the
platform and establishes its rules.155 This Article proposes an open structure in which
the states implement platform markets, and in which PUCs develop market
structures, rules, and regulations to protect consumers and the public interest.
A platform is independent of its participants, so it promotes no specific industry
structure156 or any specific geographic scope unless market rules define it. In this
proposal, exchanges would be designed, approved, and supervised by state PUCs.
The choice of the state forum imposes geographic limitations on a grid whose
physical boundaries transcend state lines. Yet, this choice respects the states’
151

See infra notes 160–163 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
153
Eisenmann et al., supra note 114, at 134 (observing that “[u]sers transact with each
other and simultaneously affiliate with platform providers” and that the “platform
encompasses the set of components and rules employed in common in most user
transactions”).
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Id. at 131.
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Tom Eisenmann, Business Model Analysis, Part 2: Platforms and Network Effects,
PLATFORMS AND NETWORKS (July 23, 2011, 3:34 PM), http://platformsandnetworks.blog
spot.com/2011/07/business-model-analysis-part-2.html
[https://perma.cc/9PWP-KHSE]
(noting that, “the concept of an ‘open platform’ can lead to confusion, because platform
mediated networks encompass several ecosystem layers—each of which can be open or
closed”).
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Kiesling, supra note 116.
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authority over retail sales and acknowledges that the advent of markets promises to
change the industry’s organizational structure substantially. There are other
possibilities, of course, such as one nationwide, federally regulated market for
electricity. After all, there is no “California Airbnb.” But a national platform would
blur, if not altogether erase long standing jurisdictional boundaries and prompt
opposition that would stop evolution toward the future in its tracks. Once again, the
reluctance to upset the jurisdictional apple cart prompts the assignment of primary
responsibility for establishing markets to individual states, although states could
choose to enter into multistate markets.
Among these platforms’ most basic functions would be the purchase and sale
of electricity. Exchanges should, however, also trade other resources, including
services and other products likely to contribute to system reliability and security.
Demand-and supply-side resources would converge: markets could simultaneously
trade both electricity and demand response, for example. A robust platform could
contribute to system flexibility by diversifying the portfolio of resources used to
meet demand and stabilize the distribution system.157 A platform that enables trading
of a variety of resources is also consistent with the goal of encouraging the broadest
possible experimentation in the distribution system. And for a state market to
support the broadest possible set of transactions, it cannot bar participation by any
class of potential customers, including incumbent utilities. In a market environment,
utilities could focus more on offering products and services than owning
infrastructure assets. They could become service providers, and enter into new
markets themselves. For example, they could analyze smart meter data to identify
and monetize specific market opportunities. They could enter into partnerships with
innovators to deliver products and services such as sophisticated energy
management packages. Finally, they could develop their own DERs (as is already
the case in some areas)158 in competition with other owners.
Eventually, markets should allow individuals to participate directly or through
entities that handle the mechanics of bidding.159 Legal impediments to broad-based
participation would be inconsistent with the goal of promoting anywhere/anytime
transactions. From an economic perspective, fees such as the “demand charges” on

157
Kristov & DeMartini, supra note 73, at 5 (observing that DERs can provide
“distributed reliability services” to help stabilize the grid).
158
Diane Cardwell & Clifford Krauss, A Big Test for Big Batteries, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/14/business/energy-environment/californiabig-batteries-as-power-plants.html [https://perma.cc/X5DE-G4AH] (discussing California
utilities’ battery storage installations).
159
GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURAL COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 25 (“Potential users of such
a platform include not just retail commodity suppliers, but also demand response
aggregators, third-party merchant DG and storage providers, and customers with excess
distributed energy.”) (emphasis added). The authors recognize the potential reliability
concerns (see infra Part IV), but believe market structures can and should be flexible enough
so that once markets demonstrate expertise with balancing supply and demand, they can scale
up to allow individuals to participate directly.
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DER owners currently contemplated by a number of states,160 would raise similar
barriers to market entry. Accordingly, the authors propose to compensate utilities by
other means. Whether a platform should feature asymmetries in pricing and features
is an important recurring issue identified in the literature.161 Imposing a fee for
participation only on one side of a transaction, for example, can hamper the
participation of that side, even if it promotes the participation of the other. Other
pricing issues, such as compensation for the platform administrator, will also need
to be addressed.
The tenet that any seller should be able to sell to any buyer, without restriction,
represents a fundamental departure from the current unidirectional system, in which
consumers are limited to the role of buyers and price takers. To this end, state
markets should adopt standardized means of interaction, rules for executing trades
among participants, as well as measurement and verification protocols. The
transition to the new power trading paradigm will be complicated by reliability
issues, as the proper balance between proven and experimental resources is critical
to meeting demand. It is anticipated that numerous aspects of the platform design
will address this problem, including settlement and imbalance mechanisms, and
informational tools such as ratings systems designed to help establish buyers’ trust
in new suppliers.162
In keeping with an evolutionary, institutionally agnostic approach, the proposed
state markets are compatible with existing climate and clean energy policies, such
as the renewable portfolio standards (“RPS”) adopted by twenty-nine states, the
District of Columbia, and three U.S. territories.163 RPS policies create markets for
solar, wind, and other renewable energy resources by requiring load-serving utilities
to source a certain percentage of the electricity they sell from renewables.164 Utilities
prove their compliance with “renewable energy credits” (“RECs”) that serve as a
guarantee of origin for renewably generated electricity. Eligible generators can sell
these RECs in addition to their power output to earn a premium for their commitment
to renewables. RECs need not be traded jointly with the electricity for which they
160

Revesz & Unel, supra note 30, at 66. For a discussion of the demand charge
controversy, see Seth Blumsack, Utilities, Solar Energy and the Fight For Your Roof, THE
CONVERSATION (Feb. 10, 2016, 6:06 AM), https://theconversation.com/utilities-solarenergy-and-the-fight-for-your-roof-54019 [https://perma.cc/K2YT-SGYX].
161
See EVANS, supra note 112, at 13. For a specific asymmetric pricing proposal in
distribution-level markets, see TABORS ET AL., supra note 58, at ES-6 (suggesting a 5% fee
in a New York REV market for the DER owner only, as “DER do not have a strong
alternative location to sell their products while the buyers of their products (ESCOs and
Distribution Utilities) can acquire alternatives in the wholesale market.”).
162
The dot com B2B exchanges failed in part because corporate procurement officers
were unwilling to purchase from unproven suppliers. See EVANS, supra note 112, at 64–65.
Buyers’ trust in sellers would be even more difficult to develop for electricity, a commodity
that most people find indispensable.
163
For a state by state listing of RPSs, see Database of State Incentives for Renewables
& Efficiency, supra note 109.
164
See Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 5, at 1631.
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were originally awarded. As a result of this unbundling, renewable electricity can
trade on existing wholesale and newly created state markets alongside conventional
electricity. Of equal importance, considering the recent finalization of the Obama
administration’s Clean Power Plan165 and similar initiatives, is the compatibility of
the trading paradigm with the introduction of a price on carbon in the—however
distant—future. Whatever the fate of the Clean Power Plan in the courts166 under the
Trump administration,167 it has already added further momentum to the climate
policy activism at the state and regional levels; including initiatives for carbon
pricing.168
4. Interplay of Two Size-Sensitive Market Formats
In the new power trading paradigm, larger electricity resources, such as thermal
power plants, will likely continue to be traded in wholesale markets, while
distributed solar and other smaller-scale resources would trade in state markets,
including most C2C and C2B transactions. Wholesale and state markets would likely
compete for the trading of midsized resources, such as cogeneration facilities,
commercial wind farms, and utility-scale solar, offering powerful incentives for
continuing efforts to improve their respective platform structure, protocols, and
other offerings.
165

For a subset of many discussions of the Clean Power Plan, see generally Emily
Hammond & Richard J. Pierce Jr., The Clean Power Plan: Testing the Limits of
Administrative Law and the Electric Grid, 7 GEO. WASH. J. OF ENERGY & ENVTL L. 1 (2016);
Hannah J. Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky, Regional Energy Governance and U.S. Carbon
Emissions, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143 (2016); Tomás Carbonell, EPA’s Proposed Clean Power
Plan: Protecting Climate and Public Health by Reducing Carbon Pollution from the U.S.
Power Sector, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 403 (2015).
166
Within twelve hours of the final rule’s publication in the federal register, the Clean
Power Plan became the most heavily litigated environmental regulation ever. See Emily
Holden & Rod Kuckro, The fate of the Obama administration’s signature climate change
rule is in the hands of the courts, E&E NEWS, https://www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_
power_plan/fact_sheets/legal [https://perma.cc/843Z-RRJ6] (last visited Sept. 10, 2017). See
West Virginia v. E.P.A., 136 S. Ct. 1000, 1000 (2016) (staying the Clean Power Plan’s
implementation until resolution of pending challenges).
167
President Donald Trump has “vowed to kill the Clean Power Plan,” but the large
number of intervenors on behalf of the EPA in its defense suggests that the agency’s
withdrawal from the suit would not be sufficient for the Clean Power Plan’s opponents to
win. See Chelsea Harvey, Trump Has Vowed to Kill the Clean Power Plan. Here’s How He
Might—and Might Not—Succeed, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/11/11/trump-has-vowed-to-kill-the-cleanpower-plan-heres-how-he-might-and-might-not-succeed/?utm_term=.dfe7c9ed7729
[https://perma.cc/K9PJ-CG9Y].
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See Michael Wara, A Bad Day for U.S. Energy and Climate Policy, STAN. L. SCH.:
LEGAL AGGREGATE (Feb. 10, 2016), https://law.stanford.edu/2016/02/10/a-bad-day-for-u-senergy-and-climate-policy/ [https://perma.cc/8352-4EGH] (noting that the U.S. electricity
industry has already begun work on complying with the Clean Power Plan’s requirements).
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This size-sensitive differentiation between two different types of markets is not
self-evident. Notwithstanding the considerable potential for market innovation, state
markets will inevitably duplicate some wholesale market functions. Allowing direct
participation in wholesale markets for resources and transactions of all sizes might,
therefore, at a glance be considered a more efficient approach. Indeed, the Supreme
Court recently provided some support for this approach with its “definitive
pronouncement”169 in FERC v. EPSA170 that FERC may promote injection of
demand response into the wholesale markets.171 This allows some end users to
consume electricity and provide resources (that is, demand response) to the grid
simultaneously. Thus, FERC v. EPSA might be read to empower full participation
of individual DERs in wholesale markets,172 although the opinion did not go that
far.173
This Article deliberately advocates against such a one-size-fits-all approach
that would make today’s wholesale markets the exclusive venue of tomorrow’s free
trade environment. Accommodation of a diverse set of smaller-scale resources and
transactions would likely impair the wholesale markets’ continued growth, their
considerable advances in balancing supply and demand across entire regions, and
the regional governance mechanisms that have fostered their development. This
framework respects these institutional arrangements by preserving these markets
and their current requirements for participation, such as minimum size restrictions
(which would prove difficult, if not impossible, for most DERs to meet).174 Inflows
of new small-scale resources would challenge the stability of markets that are not
currently set up to manage them.175 Nothing, however, should prevent savvy
entrepreneurs from aggregating blocks of DERs to reach the critical mass required
for participation in existing wholesale markets enhancing the latter’s flexibility and
resilience.176
Under this proposal, therefore, larger transactions (including block sales of
electricity by aggregators) would primarily take place in existing wholesale markets,
as would B2B and B2C transactions of electricity at utility scale. State markets
would handle smaller transactions and direct sales to end users by individuals.177
169

Eisen, FERC v. EPSA, supra note 41, at 7.
F.E.R.C. v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 774 (2016).
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Id. at 784.
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Anne Hoskins & Paul Roberti, The Essential Role of State Engagement in Demand
Response, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 14, 14–15 (2016).
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See discussion infra Part III.
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See MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 54–56.
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See Amy L. Stein, Regulating Reliability, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 1191, 1226 n.216 (2017)
(explaining how California allows entrepreneurs to aggregate DERs).
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Designers of state markets could mesh their size limits with those of the wholesale
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different markets. Infra Part III.
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With their smaller volume requirements and lower barriers to entry, state markets
also recommend themselves as test beds for experimentation with sales of products
and services not currently offered on the competitive wholesale markets.
5. Redefining the Role of Distribution Utilities
This approach redefines the role of distribution utilities, asking them to take on
responsibilities well beyond their traditional functions of serving load through
existing infrastructure. It is expected that distribution utilities will be responsible for
managing a dynamically changing portfolio of resources, including both traditional
generation and DERs. As more states experiment with distribution system reforms,
incumbent utilities will likely become the market operators.178 In this framework,
the utility dispatches electricity resources to its distribution-level customers, much
like an RTO does at the regional level. Utilities would administer markets and
continue to have responsibility for operating the distribution system, matching
supply and demand instantaneously, and maintaining this balance under a variety of
contingencies, including input of new resources. As more resources connect directly
to the market, this would require physical and intelligence capabilities to
dynamically manage resources and simultaneously balance supply and demand in
real time.
Former FERC chairman Jon Wellinghoff and others have proposed that
“independent distribution system operators” (“IDSO”) control the distribution
grid.179 Following the example of ISOs and RTOs at the wholesale level, an IDSO
would independently administer the markets, and would have operational control
over the distribution system. In keeping with the ISO/RTO trend at the transmission
level, unbundling would sever the link between ownership, or at the very least
management, of the distribution system.180 While distribution utilities might
continue to own system assets, they would turn over their control to the IDSO.
Operational control would leave the IDSO responsible for managing local loads
while interacting with the state and wholesale markets as necessary. The IDSO
model would transform today’s distribution utilities into carriers responsible for
delivering electricity and serving customers.
178
The alternative of an independent system operator, discussed below, is not viable at
present. MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 200 (discussing how utilities as DSOs is
the only option that has “proven its practical viability at the distribution level.”). This raises
considerable issues of how the utility should be compensated for developing this
infrastructure. See infra Part III.
179
See, e.g., James Tong & Jon Wellinghoff, Rooftop Parity, FORTNIGHTLY MAG.
(Aug.
2014),
https://www.fortnightly.com/fortnightly/2014/08/rooftop-parity
[https://perma.cc/HY4E-LE3K]; Jeremy Lin and Katarina Knezovic, Comparative Analysis
of Possible Designs for Flexible Distribution System Operation, 2016 13th Int’l Conf. on the
European Energy Mkt. (EEM) (Jun. 2016), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Katarina_
Knezovic/publications; Eisen, supra note 5, at 13 n.175 (discussing the IDSO’s proponents).
180
MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 198 Table 6.2 (listing this as an attribute
of a DSO).
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In keeping with its evolutionary approach, this framework neither forecloses
nor requires the IDSO model. The authors are, however, skeptical of its successful
adoption in the near term. Any IDSO would have to be invented anew. Unlike the
ISOs and RTOs that had antecedents in the power pools that predated today’s
regional grids, there are no obvious precursors to IDSOs with the requisite expertise.
Thus, states are likely to turn to incumbent utilities, rather than untested newcomers,
as retail market administrators. As the new power trading paradigm invites more
widespread participation by nonutility actors, the latter will gain critical market
expertise that could, one day, enable them to assume some, or all, of the IDSO’s
responsibilities.
Tasking incumbent utilities with administration of novel markets is, of course,
reminiscent of the classic “fox in charge of the henhouse” situation. After all, the
more successful wholesale and state markets are, the greater the competition will be
for a utility’s power generation assets. Some fear that this conflict of interest would
slow the path to market competition.181 Yet, this approach is both appropriate and
pragmatic. Ousting incumbent utilities immediately from control of the distribution
grid would ignore their substantial technological expertise and exacerbate likely
opposition to the new power trading paradigm, as discussed further below.182 These
political and technological realities suggest an evolutionary experiment with this
approach rather than leaping into an untested future. In the meantime, a robust
system of consumer protection built into the markets can help alleviate concerns
about giving distribution utilities a central role.
Finally, the continued market participation of utilities raises concerns over a
potential conflict of interest if the same utilities also serve as market administrators.
Careful PUC oversight of the development and implementation of market rules
could, however, help to avoid discriminatory practices and other undue preferences,
following the example set by successful FERC oversight and regulation of wholesale
electricity markets.
6. Compensation for Market Administration and Use of Utility Assets
In the new trading paradigm, utilities tasked with administering state markets
need to be compensated for their efforts. The specifics of their compensation lie
beyond the scope of this Article183—all the more so considering the wealth of
competing models for marketplaces and platforms, such as stock exchanges,184
181

Navigating the Energy Transformation, supra note 52, at 20 (stating that with
utilities as DSPs in New York, “the evolution to full market liberalization will be likely
slower than initially conceived”).
182
See discussion infra Section IV.C.
183
There is no standard means of compensation on platforms. Some charge a fee per
transaction to one side, while some platforms charge to both. Moreover, it is difficult in
advance to ascertain the costs of providing the platform due to potential scale economies and
other considerations. See EVANS, supra note 112, at 79.
184
Trading Fees, N.Y. STOCK EXCH., https://www.nyse.com/markets/nyse/tradinginfo/fees [https://perma.cc/Z6D5-3FSK] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
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eBay,185 Uber,186 and Airbnb187—each with its own compensation scheme. This
section, however, highlights a few high-level characteristics of a compensation
scheme that can facilitate widespread trading in energy products and services. To
invite market participation by large and small actors alike, disproportionately high
registration fees or flat fees that disproportionately privilege higher-volume traders
should be avoided. Volumetric charges based on a multi-tiered, gradually declining
fee schedule offer one way of making small-volume trades economically viable
while honoring the economies of scale associated with higher volume repeat trades.
Utilities will require compensation not only for their oversight and operation of
newly created power markets but, critically, for use of the physical infrastructure
required to transfer electricity between parties.188 FERC has long administered a
system of charges for a utility’s “wheeling”189 of power from third-party generators
through its wires.190 The new trading paradigm would require a similar system of
wire charges at the distribution level. These charges would enable utilities with ever
shrinking shares in the electricity generation mix to continue to earn revenues from
their wires while avoiding free riding by third-party generators and their customers.
Along the way, wire charges offer a metric, and possibly, a remedy for grid
congestion. While none of these objectives are mutually exclusive, their joint
realization will require a carefully designed and administered system of wire
charges.
Lessons learned from retail restructuring suggest that wire charges set above a
certain level may prevent third-party generators from competing with the generation
assets of incumbent utilities that can deliver electricity while, ultimately,
internalizing applicable wire charges. The combination of wire charges and other
factors inhibiting entry made it impossible in some states for nonutility actors to
compete with incumbent suppliers and for full retail choice to be achieved.191
185
Standard Selling Fees, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/fees.html#if_auction
[https://perma.cc/M9Z2-XSYK] (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
186
Christian Perea, What’s The Real Commission That Uber Takes From Its Drivers?
[Infographic], THE RIDESHARE GUY (July 15, 2016), http://therideshareguy.com/whats-thereal-commission-that-uber-takes-from-its-drivers-infographic/
[https://perma.cc/33DLZCFG].
187
What are Airbnb Service Fees?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/63
/what-are-host-service-fees (last visited Sept. 11, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9TGM-6CMP].
188
Rapid industry change has led to compensation for “stranded costs” (utilities’ costs
not yet recouped). See Hammond & Rossi, supra note 144, at 646–47. The authors also
acknowledge the challenge of compensating existing generators, and believe it may be
addressed with the ability to bid into markets.
189
Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority, supra note 15, at 1818 (defining wheeling as
transmitting power for third parties over transmission lines and discussing FERC’s wheeling
policies of the 1990s).
190
See supra text accompanying note 103 (discussing FERC’s orders on this subject).
191
See, e.g., VA. STATE CORP. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE COMMISSION ON ELECTRIC
UTILITY RESTRUCTURING OF THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY ii–iv (2005),
https://www.scc.virginia.gov/comm/reports/2005_intro.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z6F-VTNE]
(detailing the lack of choice in Virginia, leading to suspension of the state’s retail choice
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Nodal pricing would enable a dynamic schedule of wire charges that reflects
congestion levels with high spatial and temporal resolution. Through iterative
learning processes, congestion-sensitive wire charges would eventually inform
clearing prices for the sale of delivered electricity in the newly created power
markets. In the process, market participants will learn to place a premium on DERs
and other local generation assets whose output requires sparse use of distribution
cables and, therefore, incur smaller wire charges.
7. Hands-Off Regulation for Off-Grid Transactions
A final attribute involves the treatment of off-system transactions. The authors
anticipate few restrictions on direct peer-to-peer transactions that do not involve the
use of the distribution system. Think of the above example of a California commune
selling the output from its solar installation in the form of pre-charged batteries at
her local farmers’ market.192 Such a small-scale, off-grid transaction would not merit
the same regulatory treatment as delivery over the grid’s distribution system.
As batteries and other storage technologies continue to move along the
technology learning curve,193 off-grid transactions may grow in scale. Eventually,
that might begin to impact overall system reliability by changing demand
substantially for on-grid transactions. At this point, some tracking of off-grid
transactions may become necessary, as their availability could affect overall system
demand and, hence, system reliability. In the near to medium term, the need for
greater oversight should, however, be outweighed by the dampening impact of
anything more than light-handed regulation.
III. TOWARD A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FREE TRADE IN ELECTRICITY
The electricity trading framework rests on two core policy building blocks. The
first is CAISO’s initiative to allow aggregators to sell DERs into wholesale markets.
The second is New York’s commitment to refashioning distribution utilities as
“distribution system platform providers” (DSPPs) responsible for administering the
distribution-level system and operating markets for distribution-level products and
services. This section describes the central features of both programs and gives a
sense of how they would lead toward full electricity trading, if revised and extended
to a wider geographic scope.
Currently at the pilot stage, California’s aggregation initiative offers an
intriguing way of broadening the pool of participants in existing wholesale markets,
albeit through intermediaries. A recent FERC rulemaking proposal suggests that
CAISO’s program could be extended to other ISOs and RTOs across the nation.
Conversely, the New York program sets the stage for critical innovation and market
program). See also William T. Reisinger, Public Utilities Law, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 137,
139–53 (2014) (discussing the state’s experience with retail choice).
192
See supra Section I.B.3.
193
See Stein, supra note 43, at 707–08 (discussion the expansion of battery storage).
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building at the state level that will enable smaller-scale suppliers to engage directly
in transactions with individuals. Properly combined, expanded, and refined, both
programs could go a long way toward unlocking free trade in electricity.
A. Building Blocks: Initiatives in New York and California
1. Aggregating DERs for Wholesale Market Integration (California)
The California regional grid operator (“CAISO”) has developed an initiative to
promote DER integration in the regional grid by eliminating structural market
barriers to DER participation.194 For example, a rooftop solar owner cannot currently
bid any excess electricity into the wholesale market, due to minimum requirements
of both size and telemetry.195 Aggregation of smaller outputs of electricity from
multiple generators would give DERs access to California’s wholesale markets for
which they do not qualify as individual resources. Market access would open up new
sales channels for distributed solar and other smaller-scale generators that are
currently at the mercy of a monopsony buyer—their local utility.196 Aggregated
market access offers sizeable benefits to DERs and to the grid itself. California’s
reliance on net metering has made it difficult to keep track of the exact capacity and
output of customer-sited DERs.197 Aggregation would help increase the visibility of
these resources enabling the grid operator—CAISO—to better anticipate their
contributions, integrate more renewables into the grid, and rely on a wider range of
resources when balancing supply with demand.198
To achieve these goals, CAISO developed the “Distributed Energy Resource
Provider” initiative199 to enable direct bids of DERs into California’s wholesale
markets through a new form of supplier—the “distributed energy resource provider”
(“DERP”).200 This “new type of market resource similar to a generating facility” will
aggregate the output of multiple smaller-scale residential and commercial DERs,
and sell the resulting blocks into wholesale markets in sizes sufficient to meet market
minimums.201 The proposal’s major innovation is to “treat the aggregation, rather
than the individual distributed energy resources, as the market resource.”202 DERs
aggregated in this fashion could take a wide variety of forms. The proposal defines
194
CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR CORP., FAST FACTS 1 (2016), http://www.caiso.com/
documents/flexibleresourceshelprenewables_fastfacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4BN-6JB].
195
Id. at 1–2.
196
Id. at 2.
197
See Mormann et al., supra note 25, at 69 (explaining that data “is not readily
available for . . . solar facilities that are customer-owned and located ‘behind the meter.’”).
198
CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR CORP., supra note 194, at 3.
199
See FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, ORDER ACCEPTING PROPOSED TARIFF REVISIONS
SUBJECT TO CONDITION, ER16-1085-000 (June 2, 2016) (describing and approving the
initiative).
200
CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR CORP., supra note 194, at 3.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 8–9.
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DERs broadly to include any resources with first points of interconnection to utility
distribution companies or metered subsystems, including rooftop solar systems,
storage systems, grid-connected microgrids, and even plug-in electric vehicles.203
These resources could be located in front of or behind a customer’s meter.
To illustrate, if an electric vehicle charging station wants to store electricity
from incoming batteries and use it as a market resource, it, not individual drivers,
would handle the mechanics of metering and other logistics, and bid the resource
into CAISO’s wholesale markets. The proposal imposes minimum and maximum
size restrictions on both aggregated blocks and their individual “member”
resources.204 If a bundle of DERs includes resources located at different pricing
nodes on the CAISO grid, the bundle’s aggregate size may not exceed 20 MW.
Notwithstanding objections by some commenters who believe this practice would
limit the geographic reach of aggregators,205 CAISO’s proposal limits each
aggregator to a single aggregation point to ensure that it does not create additional
congestion on the CAISO-controlled grid.206
Like any other market participant, DERPs must ensure that the resources they
bid into wholesale markets are furnished at the right time and in the right quantities.
This requires sophisticated remote-control mechanisms, metering and
communication with individual DER owners, and familiarity with the CAISO
markets’ scheduling and bidding requirements.207 In practice, a DERP could either
employ a “scheduling coordinator” or act as its own coordinator.208 The coordinator
would serve as an intermediary for CAISO dispatch instructions, coordinating with
individual resources in the aggregation. This mediated coordination regime relieves
CAISO of the burden of communicating and managing vast numbers of individual
resources.209

203

Id. at 5.
Under the proposal, the minimum size for an aggregated resource is 0.5 MW, and
the maximum size for an aggregation spanning pricing nodes is 20 MW. Generating units
between 0.5 MW and 1 MW can become part of an aggregation under specified conditions,
but units 1 MW or greater are ineligible for aggregation, and must satisfy CAISO’s
requirements for market participation instead. ORDER ACCEPTING PROPOSED TARIFF
REVISIONS SUBJECT TO CONDITION, supra note 199, at 2–3.
205
Herman K. Trabish, How California plans to integrate distributed resources into its
ISO market, UTILITY DIVE (June 24, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/howcalifornia-plans-to-integrate-distributed-resources-into-its-iso-market/401123/
[https://perma.cc/8XD5-EHGE].
206
CAISO DER AGGREGATION TARIFF AMENDMENT PROPOSAL, supra note 149, at 10–
11.
207
See, e.g., ORDER ACCEPTING PROPOSED TARIFF REVISIONS SUBJECT TO CONDITION,
supra note 199, at 4–6 (telemetry).
208
Id. at 2.
209
See id. at 5; see also Trabish, supra note 205 (quoting CAISO Senior Public
Information Office Steven Greenlee, “We can’t put an ISO meter on every rooftop solar
installation . . . . The cost would be prohibitive.”).
204
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As this proposal involved wholesale markets under FERC jurisdiction,210 the
CAISO needed, and secured, FERC’s approval.211 The broad definition of DERs
could dramatically expand the types and amounts of distributed resources in
CAISO’s wholesale markets, create new classes of grid participants, and stimulate
market competition. A wide variety of firms—electric vehicle charging stations, DR
companies, home automation firms, and partnerships between battery storage and
solar leasing companies—have already expressed interest in using California’s
aggregation initiative to enter wholesale markets that are currently beyond their
reach. 212
2. Transforming Utilities (New York)
New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision (“REV”) framework, launched by
the State’s PSC in 2014,213 seeks comprehensive reform of the regulatory structure
and treatment of the state’s utilities. The initiative’s centerpiece targets the
transformation of load-serving utilities into “Distribution System Platform
Providers” (“DSPPs”) to facilitate greater integration of DERs and to provide
customers with enhanced energy management options. Under this model, the role of
utilities would change from sellers of electricity to system operators and platform
providers.
The PSC split regulatory development in the REV proceeding into two separate
tracks. Track One focuses on DERs, integrated system planning, distribution-level
markets, and the Distribution System Platform Provider (“DSPP”) concept.214 The
Track One orders refashion distribution utilities as platform providers215 (rejecting a
proposal that these functions be handled by independent entities) and task them with
administering the distribution system and, eventually, operating markets for
distribution-level products and services. The Distribution System Platform Provider
will act as a system optimizer, relying on a diverse portfolio of resources, including
210

See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2015).
ORDER ACCEPTING PROPOSED TARIFF REVISIONS SUBJECT TO CONDITION, supra
note 199, at 1.
212
Trabish, supra note 205.
213
The REV encompasses a number of different reforms, including the proceedings to
refashion the state’s electric utilities. See Reforming the Energy Vision, N.Y. STATE
https://rev.ny.gov/ [https://perma.cc/J6UZ-LEH6] (last visited July 31, 2017).
214
The PSC’s order of February 2015 and subsequent orders in 2016 elaborated on the
DSPP concept. New York PSC Track One Framework Order, supra note 60, at 12. The
cornerstones of Track One are the state’s major utilities’ Distributed System Implementation
Plans and the joint filing in November 2016 of a Supplemental Distributed System
Implementation Plan to establish a coordinated five year vision for utility distribution system
planning, grid operations, and market operations. JOINT UTILS. OF N.Y., SUPPLEMENTAL
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: CASE 16-M-0411
(2016),
http://jointutilitiesofny.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/3A80BFC9-CBD4-4DFD-AE62831271013816.pdf [https://perma.cc/58LH-QTSH].
215
New York PSC Track One Framework Order, supra note 60, at 12.
211
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DERs, to serve customers. Resources could be provided by the utilities themselves,
as now, or by customers or third-party aggregators. Load-serving utilities would also
retain ownership of their distribution assets, with the obligations they currently have
to maintain and upgrade the systems under state laws.
Track Two focuses on reforming utility ratemaking practices to reflect the
DSPP model.216 It aims to modernize the utility business model and align utility
financial interests with evolving consumer interests—adding market-based platform
earnings and outcome-based earning opportunities for utilities.217 In this system,
DSPPs are expected to derive a growing share of net income from the growth and/or
operation of market solutions beyond the traditional cost-of-service model.218
In the near term, regulators and a wide variety of stakeholders are working on
topics such as requirements for DER interconnection and hosting capacity. Fully
robust markets for DERs are still years away, and not anticipated until a later stage
of the REV proceeding. In the design advanced in a white paper, DSPPs would coown the newly established platform: a “business ecosystem” intended to incorporate
a forward market and a separate clearing market.219 Its designer believes a “Platform
Market . . . will best fulfill the objectives of the Commission as articulated in its
Framework Order.”220 The Platform Market would resemble platform structures
used by companies such as Uber and Airbnb that match buyers and sellers in
exchange for a percentage fee. Thus, it defines a “core interaction” that, like Uber’s
pairings of drivers with prospective passengers, matches market participants with
one another.221 The following illustration from the white paper is a snapshot of the
kinds of transactions that could be enabled on the New York platform.222

216

Id. at 19; see also Proc. on Mot. of the Commn. in Regard to Reforming the Energy
Vision, Developing the REV Market in New York: DPS Staff Report and Proposal, 14-M0101, at 6 (N.Y.P.S.C. Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter New York DPS REV Staff Straw
Proposal].
217
New York REV Track Two Order, supra note 117, at 25–26.
218
Id. at 47–48 (describing Platform Service Revenues).
219
TABORS ET AL., supra note 58, at 34.
220
Id. at 57.
221
Id. at 40 (“Parties can schedule delivery once parties complete the exchange of
information and reach an agreement. The core interaction is completed, the parties have
created and exchanged value, and there is a settlement.”).
222
Id. at 59. The illustration refers to an “ESCO,” or “energy services company,” the
familiar umbrella term for a third-party company other than a utility that provides energy
services. New York law defines an “Energy services company” as “an entity eligible to sell
energy services to end-use customers using the transmission or distribution system of a
utility.” N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349-d(b) (McKinney 2017).
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Besides balancing supply and demand variations at the distribution level, the
DSPP would link with the New York ISO, which manages the state’s high-voltage
grid and administers wholesale markets. A DSPP could participate in New York’s
wholesale market as both buyer and seller. As a buyer, it would purchase electricity
from the wholesale markets, as is common among utilities today, to supplement for
any shortfall in generation from locally sited assets. As a seller, the platform provider
could bid local electricity resources, including DERs into the wholesale markets,
competing in energy, capacity, and even ancillary services markets with merchant
generators and other suppliers.
B. A Strategy to Unlock Free Trade for Electric Power
The path toward full electricity trading warrants a combination and extension
of the California and New York programs to the rest of the nation. At the outset, this
effort requires visualizing two separate initiatives, conducted at opposite ends of the
United States, impacting different levels of the electric grid, implemented for
different purposes, and approved by different levels of regulatory authority, as part
and parcel of a unified whole. With its reliance on programs already under way, this
approach does not call for an “energy miracle.”223 Nor does it require active policy
development by the federal government, which is unlikely in any event in the current
policy environment. The new power trading paradigm can be achieved here and now
without the need to invent a new energy ecosystem from whole cloth.

223

See, e.g., David Roberts, The Importance of Being Ernest Moniz, VOX (Sept. 22,
2016), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2016/9/22/13010094/ernest-monizclean-energy-innovation [https://perma.cc/4PS8-EHHC] (interviewing then DOE Secretary
Moniz on whether an “energy miracle[]” would be needed for addressing climate change).
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As with any policy innovation, the California and New York experiments will
yield valuable lessons, which may shorten the learning curve for others. Still, much
work remains to be done before both programs can be combined and scaled into a
seamless electricity trading ecosystem—a combination and extension that neither
state envisioned. ISOs and RTOs would need to make technical and operational
changes to their markets, and state PUCs would need to establish distribution-level
market structures. Moreover, each program would benefit from tweaks before
scaling it to the rest of the nation. Also, interposition of state markets between
wholesale markets and end users would require careful design choices at the
markets’ intersection, as discussed below. And while state policymakers are free to
copy the New York experiment, scaling up the CAISO program to other wholesale
markets would require FERC’s involvement.
1. Refinement and Expansion of Emerging State Programs
The CAISO initiative offers a strong foundation for granting wholesale market
access to aggregated resources nationwide. In submitting its proposal to FERC,
CAISO noted that its DER aggregation framework was potentially scalable.
California’s program could, if successful, be extended to other parts of the country
through voluntary adoption by other ISOs and RTOs. This practice would require
no fundamental change in federal regulatory authority. Indeed, FERC’s notice of
proposed rulemaking issued in November 2016 contemplates using California as a
model for the rest of the nation. In its proposal, the Commission requests that other
ISOs and RTOs identify obstacles to replicating CAISO’s DER aggregation
framework, without suggesting that new authority would be necessary to do so.224
Successful deployment of the DER aggregation model in California may
promote more widespread adoption by the other regional grids.225 ISOs and RTOs
would not need to alter the basic structure of their wholesale markets to open them
up to DER aggregators.226 In fact, some RTOs already grant market access to
aggregated resources, for example, in the case of demand response.227 Offering the
same treatment to DERs more broadly could prove a cost efficient remedy for
regional grid operators seeking to alleviate capacity constraints and network
congestion issues.
Following the approach outlined in FERC’s proposed rule, other ISOs and
RTOs could adopt a structure similar to California’s, developing aggregation
systems for DERs, and allowing aggregated bids of DERs into the wholesale
224

FERC could mandate this by order, under its authority over the wholesale markets.
This is unlikely in the current Administration, so each ISO or RTO would likely decide for
itself whether to follow California’s lead, as encouraged to do so by the proposed FERC rule.
225
Of course, there is no guarantee that other ISOs and RTOs will adopt the California
program. Recent history suggests that ISOs and RTOs can be cautious about borrowing
innovations from their counterparts.
226
Moreover, the wholesale markets have considerable iterative experience in revising
market structures. Hammond & Spence, supra note 24, at 149.
227
F.E.R.C. v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 767 (2016).
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markets for energy, capacity, ancillary services that they administer.228 Adoption of
California’s aggregation initiative by existing ISOs and RTOs would enable DER
participation in wholesale markets covering nearly two-thirds of the nation. Aside
from New York and Texas, all other regional networks cover multiple states, which
would allow DER aggregators to create larger footprints. The ability to aggregate
resources across a multistate area could spur more robust competition among
aggregators and help mitigate issues related to the intermittency of solar, wind, and
other weather-dependent DERs. The same logic would suggest that the current trend
toward expansion of regional grids229 would create even greater opportunities for
aggregators.
Like CAISO, other ISOs and RTOs would need to make technical and
operational changes to accommodate DER aggregator bids, for example, by
reforming existing markets’ rules and structures.230 At the individual DER level, the
aggregation design relies on the DER providers, not the market administrators, to
create and manage new market resources.231 Therefore, ISOs and RTOs will need to
pay careful attention to the interface between aggregators and markets. Another area
of importance is ensuring that markets are designed to send price signals to DERs
that more accurately reflect conditions at individual systems. Current wholesale
market designs lack the necessary spatial and temporal resolution.232 Grid operators
concerned over reliability challenges related to DERs may set minimum and
maximum requirements for the geographic distribution, check quantity and quality
of aggregator bids, and follow CAISO’s example of gradually ramping up the market
share of aggregated DERs.233
New York’s REV initiative offers a blueprint for creating distribution-level
markets in other states. From a political economy perspective, New York’s utilities
have proven that incumbents can put aside their conservatism and enter into new
roles as system administrators and platform providers. As the first state to establish
markets for distribution-level services New York will serve as a test bed, offering
empirical evidence for the practical viability of the next generation of restructuring
policies.
The New York program openly acknowledges the need for iterative policy
learning, as illustrated by its approach to C2C transactions. The PSC order directing
228
CAISO’s initiative does not currently include the capacity market. ORDER
ACCEPTING PROPOSED TARIFF REVISIONS SUBJECT TO CONDITION, supra note 199, at 1.
229
See supra note 22 and accompanying text (CAISO proposed expansion).
230
See, e.g., N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES
ROADMAP FOR NEW YORK’S WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS 6 (2017),
http://nyssmartgrid.com/wp-content/uploads/DRAFT-Distributed-Energy-ResourcesRoadmap-NYISO-8-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/B36G-H8W9] (envisioning replacing two
current markets for DR with revised markets for DER participation).
231
Under this approach, if an aggregator could not exercise technical control over an
amount of power sufficient to meet minimum wholesale market size restrictions, it could bid
a smaller block in the state markets.
232
N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, supra note 230, at 24.
233
See supra note 194, and accompanying text.
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the establishment of markets does not provide for direct participation by individuals
but contemplates the possibility of eventual extension, noting that, “each utility
should evaluate the success of the marketplace and identify whether and when they
should be expanded to include all end use consumers.”234 New York’s cautious
approach deserves praise in an industry whose history is replete with overly
ambitious reform efforts gone badly awry.235 In the long run, however, market access
for end users and availability of C2C transactions will be crucial steps toward free
trade for electric power.
Regional wholesale markets and emerging state distribution-level markets do
not exist in isolation from one another but, rather, will require coordination between
regional grid operators and state PUCs on technical and operational matters. In the
REV proceeding, the New York PSC staff noted that implementing state markets
would require changes to wholesale market structures and coordination and
alignment of state market rules to minimize or eliminate overlaps, including
“communications technology and procedures, and measurement and verification
methodologies.”236
Further need for coordination arises to avoid double-counting and to promote
overall system reliability: for example, ascertaining whether a specific resource was
traded in wholesale or state markets, and not both simultaneously.237 Demand
response and storage are two types of resources that can have value at both levels
and would plan to capture value streams in a wide range of markets. A battery
storage unit could conceivably bid into both wholesale and state markets, providing
capacity or demand reduction services that require standby availability but may not
be called upon.238 Such double-trading would promote overcompensation and could
have adverse impacts on system reliability if, for instance, extreme weather and
other peak demand events lead both markets to simultaneously call on the same
resource. It would also jeopardize the availability of critical resources when they are
needed most. Accordingly, market administrators should cooperate to prevent
234

New York REV Track Two Order, supra note 117, at 89.
ISSER, supra note 87, at 459–63 (critiquing restructuring’s many failures). This
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adopt “a structured decision-making method the core of which is a multi-step iterative
process for adjusting management measures to changing circumstances or new information
about the effectiveness of prior measures or the system being managed.” See, e.g., Robin
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double-trading, work out a system of priorities for committing resources to markets,
and track impacts at the interface between wholesale and state markets.239
New York is an obvious test bed for addressing these and other coordination
challenges.240 Its wholesale market operates solely within state boundaries and,
therefore, allows for modifications without the need for another state’s consent.
Once the state has developed expertise with the DSPP system, the regional grid
operator New York ISO (“NYISO”) could establish an aggregation system similar
to that of California, and coordinate it with the state markets.241 At present, DER
aggregation is limited to demand response participation in New York’s wholesale
market for capacity; no aggregated resource may bid in the energy market.242
Demand response participation is further limited by restrictions that effectively bar
participation of entities offering small-scale reductions in demand.243 It is anticipated
that stakeholder discussions on this and other issues would take place at the same
time the state is gaining experience with distribution-level markets.
2. Sample Transactions
This section returns to the categories of transactions, and discusses how typical
sample transactions might take place under the model, assuming markets have been
created, and applicable state laws have been modified. As noted above, this Article’s
taxonomy and classification of a transaction are based on its point of origin and
ultimate terminus; regardless of any intermediate steps that are required to
consummate it. The sample C2C transaction using wholesale markets outlined
below, for example, would be executed through a C2B sale by the prosumer of
energy to an aggregator followed by a B2B sale from the aggregator to a wholesale
buyer and, ultimately, a B2C sale from that buyer to the end consumer.
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N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, supra note 230, at 13 (examples of required
coordination). One way of accomplishing this is through pilot projects. See, e.g., Jan Ellen
Spiegel, Another $1.2 Billion Substation? No Thanks, Says Utility, We’ll Find a Better Way,
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California could also accomplish this, but that would require the state’s PUC to
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implement.
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MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 60 (noting the importance of this and
that New York’s wholesale market operator is already contemplating it). See generally N.Y.
INDEP. SYS. OP., supra note 230 (providing a roadmap for a future alternative energy-based
electrical grid).
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The overall transaction is characterized by looking at its beginning and
endpoint to emphasize the status of the eventual seller and the buyer as primarily
engaged (or not) in the profession of producing and selling energy. Moreover, this
characterization also allows an analytical focus on the locus at which the transaction
originates. This Article classifies the Smith-Jones transaction below as a C2C
transaction because neither Smith nor Jones is primarily engaged in the profession
of producing and selling energy, and because the parties are an individual seller and
buyer operating from their residences.
(a) C2C Transactions
John Smith lives in Connecticut (in the ISO-NE regional grid) and has
solar panels on the roof of his house. He wants to sell excess midday output
to Jane Jones, another Connecticut resident who needs power to charge
her electric vehicle during the day.
Smith has two options, depending on whether he turns to the wholesale market
or the newly created state market. If Smith chooses the wholesale market, he would
first have to find an aggregator interested in his power output, as his residential solar
facility falls well short of the minimum size requirements for wholesale market
access. The aggregator would purchase Smith’s output along with that of other DERs
and bid them as a single block into the ISO-NE wholesale energy market.244 Due to
the minimum size requirements for wholesale market transactions, Jones, too,
cannot trade directly on the wholesale market, but would instead purchase power
from her local retail supplier, which buys part or all of its power on the wholesale
market.
The transaction centering on the wholesale market therefore has three subparts.
The first is Smith’s sale to the aggregator, a C2B transaction that falls squarely
within the FPA’s definition of a sale at wholesale,245 and would be regulated by
FERC approval of tariff changes in the ISO-NE regional grid.246 The second
transaction is the aggregator’s sale into the ISO-NE energy market and the retail
supplier’s purchase from it, a B2B transaction regulated under current wholesale
market rates, also subject to FERC approval. The third is the B2C transaction in
which the retail supplier sells electricity to Jones, regulated under state law by the
Connecticut Public Utilities Regulatory Authority.
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The aggregation approach’s elegant simplicity in defining the physical connection
allows Smith to forego the expense of an individual connection to ISO-NE markets and the
complexity of wholesale market terms and conditions, all of which would be transparent to
him.
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See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2015).
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This could take place under the process contemplated in FERC’s proposed rule on
DER aggregation, which discusses specific barriers to participation currently existing in the
different regions. Supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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If Smith chooses the state electricity market, he can sell directly to Jones. This
would be a pure C2C transaction where Smith sells his excess power through the
state market’s competitive bidding process to Jones; with delivery through her local
distribution service provider.247 Smith would receive compensation at the state
energy market price when the transaction was settled. In practice, the fungibility of
electric power and the commingling of electrons in the grid suggest that Jones would
receive undifferentiated power from the grid, not “Smith’s power.”248
The state-market route is considered superior and a major benefit of the
proposed electricity trading ecosystem, with its ability to lower transaction costs and
to incentivize “local” transactions that help reduce grid congestion issues. If Smith
sells through the wholesale market, Jones will have to buy his electricity at a price
that is based on the market clearing price, presumably including the aggregator’s
transaction costs and profit margin, plus her local retail provider’s transaction costs
and profit margin. In contrast, a state market-based transaction between Smith and
Jones would cut out intermediaries, thereby reducing the parties’ transaction costs.
From a grid congestion perspective, state markets that incorporate the local
distribution service provider’s cost of delivery of Smith’s electricity to Jones can
provide powerful price signals to incentivize local transactions that do not require
costly long-distance transmission of electricity and, hence, alleviate grid congestion
issues.
(b) C2B Transactions
Tom Williams lives in rural Pennsylvania (in the PJM regional grid), and
has solar panels on the roof of his house. He wants to sell excess midday
output to SellerCo, a retail supplier that serves customers in Philadelphia.
Williams has two options, similar to those available to John Smith but with
some important differences. If Williams turns to the state electricity market, he can
sell directly to SellerCo. In this scenario, Smith bids his excess power into the state
market where SellerCo purchases it at the market clearing price. It would then be up
to SellerCo to decide whether to sell this electricity onto its customers or whether to
resell it on the market.
If Williams prefers a more hands-off approach, he could sell his power to an
aggregator in a C2B transaction subject to FERC regulation, as explained above.
The aggregator would then combine Williams’ output with that of other DERs and
bid them as a single block in the PJM wholesale energy market. Unlike Jones in the
above example, SellerCo can (and does) purchase power on the wholesale market in
247

Thus, retail choice states such as Connecticut might need to change their laws on
electricity choice to accommodate the advent of state markets.
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See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972)
(describing how power supplied to the grid from a variety of sources eventually merges and
commingles just as molecules of water from different sources (rains, streams, etc.) would be
commingled in a reservoir).
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a B2B transaction regulated under FERC approved wholesale market tariffs. As
before, the state-market route promises greater cost efficiency for the parties thanks
to reduced transaction and, presumably, delivery costs.
(c) B2B Transactions
Distribution utility LargeCo serves customers in states in the ISO-NE
regional grid, and needs to purchase power to serve its customers.
LargeCo also serves as administrator of the Connecticut state electricity
market.
LargeCo has two options. First, as it may do now, LargeCo can engage in a
conventional B2B transaction to purchase the electricity required to meet its
customers’ demand in wholesale markets. Under the new power trading paradigm,
LargeCo could also turn to the state electricity market. Here, LargeCo would engage
in the flipside of the C2B transaction described above. This example illustrates the
flexibility that the proposed electricity trading ecosystem affords load-serving the
entities like LargeCo to take advantage of a wider menu of supply options for serving
their customers.
This example further illustrates some institutional challenges posed by the new
power trading paradigm. LargeCo’s dual role as a load serving utility and
administrator of the state electricity market calls for functional separation between
its business units to protect against market manipulation.249 Finally, this example
underscores the need for coordination between market administrators to ensure
system reliability. Absent such coordination, LargeCo’s electricity purchases from
DER owners on the state electricity market could impact the accuracy of capacity
requirement forecasts and, with it, supply and demand balancing in wholesale
markets.250
IV. MOVING FORWARD: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
This new trading paradigm represents a higher plane of evolution that builds
on, rather than altogether displaces, today’s electricity sector. Reaching this plane
will require significant, and sometimes painful, changes to the physical, regulatory,
and business architecture of the grid, while addressing concerns related to the
security, reliability, and equity of the new electricity trading ecosystem.
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A. Physical Challenges
Few of the physical building blocks required to realize free trade for electric
power currently exist in anything more than inchoate form. Even if grid owners
endeavored to provide more widespread access to DERs and other market entrants,
there would be no sufficient network to do so. Today’s distribution grid was
premised on the assumption that interconnection would only be required for the
unidirectional purposes of energy consumption. Even emerging technologies, such
as electric vehicle charging stations that could serve as access points to the
distribution grid are being developed for unidirectional transactions. Thus, the grid
will have to be retrofitted with technology that enables full-scale, two-way traffic of
electricity and, critically, related information.251 Advanced communications
technologies can harness the internet’s ubiquity and velocity to transmit the data
necessary for grid operators to manage, control, and integrate large numbers of
technologically diverse distributed generation assets, demand response providers,
and other behind-the-meter activities.252 Such upgrades, however, will not be
possible without large-scale investment in an industry whose long-established
regulatory structure offers little incentives for technology innovation.
There is little precedent for using the conventional ratemaking structure to
reward utilities for being innovators.253 On the contrary, in the absence of regulatory
and other nudges, for example through public policy support, the electricity
industry’s traditional ratemaking model does little to encourage investment in R&D
for emerging energy technologies. Utility revenues in many states are based on costof-service regulation. Under this approach, PUCs approve electricity rates based on
the utility’s cost of service, offering an allowed rate of return designed to enable
electric utilities to raise necessary funds on capital markets. While this rate structure
has been shown to encourage capital expenditures beyond the socially optimal
level,254 it does not necessarily incentivize R&D investment as PUCs rarely include
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Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism, supra note 5 and accompanying text; David J.
Unger, How an Obscure Piece of Technology Will Help Put More Solar on the Grid,
MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Aug. 9, 2016), http://midwestenergynews.com/2016/08/09/howan-obscure-piece-of-technology-will-help-put-more-solar-on-the-grid/ [https://perma.cc/
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MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 52, at 37–38.
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As New York’s PSC observed in the REV proceeding, most state regulation rewards
utilities for capital investments. New York REV Track Two Order, supra note 117, at 32
(noting the “lack of an incentive to innovate, bias toward capital expenditures, and
asymmetry of information in the rate-setting process”).
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Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962).
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R&D expenditures in their rate-base calculations.255 It is hardly surprising, therefore,
that several studies have shown rate regulation to be a disincentive to R&D spending
and innovation.256
B. Regulatory Challenges
The most significant impediment to progress toward an electricity trading
ecosystem is the dated regulatory structure governing electricity distribution systems
across the nation.257 The scope of change necessary to allow the grid’s aging physical
architecture to accommodate distributed generation, demand response, and other
innovative energy technologies will require reform of the underlying regulatory
institutions, structures, and processes.
The introduction of state electricity markets—a cornerstone of the proposed
electricity trading ecosystem—would require rethinking the regulatory approach
that has governed retail electricity sales for over a century. New market structures,
combined with regulatory oversight to ensure their fairness, would become an
important primary means of ensuring that electricity rates to end users are just and
reasonable. This will require much of state regulators, including the vision to
anticipate how markets can fail and how consumers can be protected from
exaggerated price fluctuations and other fallout from these market failures. The good
news is that state regulators need not start from scratch but, instead, can turn to the
similar transformation well underway in the regulation of wholesale transactions that
are increasingly executed on competitive markets for critical guidance. Following
the wholesale markets’ overwhelmingly positive example, sophisticated regulatory
designs—that carefully establish and delimit the market structures, terms and
conditions of exchange—combined with constant oversight and timely interventions
where necessary can contain the risks to consumers associated with regulatory
innovation.
Such regulatory innovation will not be possible without new laws, regulations,
and institutional reform, as illustrated by the example of New York’s REV efforts.
This Article calls on PUCs to convert the core functions of their regulation of
distribution utilities from rate setting to market oversight. This would entail
substantial revisions to the traditional utility ratemaking model. Prior to New York’s
recent initiative, no state was willing to compensate a utility for transforming its
255

See Tooraj Jamasb & Michael Pollitt, Liberalisation and R&D in Network
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business model from compensation for the delivery (and often generation) of
electricity to that of market administrator.258 As noted above in the sample
transactions, PUCs will also have to monitor markets carefully to ensure that the
utility-turned-administrator does not offer preferential treatment to its own resources
at the expense of other market participants. All of this will require considerable
reworking of state laws and provoke massive uncertainty, at least in the near term,
with the potential for conflict and turf wars among actors whose roles in the system
have been largely ossified over time.
The silver lining, however, is that the proposed ecosystem will ultimately
require less regulatory intervention, not more. In a system where electricity and
related products and services are traded freely among a large number of diverse
actors, regulators will no longer need to rely on their limited expertise with DERs
and often incomplete utility disclosures to set electricity rates, leaving the
determination of clearing prices to the market’s invisible hand. Nor will rate
determinations take years and require the substantial transaction costs of rate cases;
markets can be much nimbler. Properly designed and administered markets that
serve, among others, as conduits for critical information should further help with the
controversial task of assessing the true value of solar based on local demand,
transmission congestion, and other factors.259
The new trading paradigm will also require difficult conversations about the
evolving allocation of authority over the electric grid between state and federal
regulators. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s recent expansion of federal
jurisdiction over electricity regulation,260 states continue to supervise distribution
utilities and will have substantial responsibility for shaping the new power trading
paradigm. The proposed introduction of state-sponsored electricity markets at the
distribution level is a tribute to the pivotal role of state regulation in the electricity
sector.
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FERC, meanwhile, retains considerable authority over wholesale markets,
another key component of this proposal. The DER aggregation structure is
functionally similar to the mechanism the Supreme Court approved for bidding
demand response into wholesale markets in its recent FERC v. EPSA decision. It
stands to reason, therefore, that FERC has sufficient authority to approve individual
ISO/RTOs’ aggregation proposals, as it did with CAISO. The new power trading
paradigm respects FERC’s authority by reserving larger-scale transactions for the
wholesale markets. This, too, is consistent with the popular understanding of the
FPA’s language: the dictionary defines “wholesale” as “the sale of commodities in
quantity usually for resale.”261
By relying on state markets as the default venue for direct sales to (and from)
end users, this proposal reduces jurisdictional tension. The FPA’s definition of
“wholesale” forecloses direct purchases by consumers, as it extends federal
authority only to sales for resale of electric energy.262 The Act’s core statutory
provisions have not changed in over 80 years, and it is unlikely that Congress will
amend the statute to permit direct consumer purchases in wholesale markets. After
all, any such proposal would be met with considerable backlash from state PUCs
concerned over the resulting dilution of their authority over retail sales of electricity.
Some sales on state markets could impact the wholesale markets. If, for
example, a seller could choose whether to bid into wholesale or state markets,
choosing the latter over the former might affect wholesale market prices. Under
FERC v. EPSA, this might be sufficient to trigger FERC jurisdiction over the rules
governing the intersection between the two markets as a “practice affecting rates.”
There has been considerable uncertainty about the interplay of federal and state
jurisdiction in situations where rules might need to be developed to manage the
intersection between markets.263 Regulators should be expected to work
cooperatively when necessary to harmonize the overlap between wholesale and state
markets.
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C. Economic Challenges
From an economic perspective, the proposed power trading paradigm creates
considerable risks and opportunities for incumbent utilities. After decades of
regulatory protection, many utilities have little experience with the threat of
competition, let alone assessing whether innovative products and services will
succeed in the marketplace. 264 The proposed C2C transactions are certain to elicit
considerable opposition from utilities who fear erosion of their market share. Even
if utilities are guaranteed appropriate compensation for use of their distribution
assets, their revenues will still depend on market-based pricing and, hence, be hard
to forecast.
Whether utilities will eventually embrace change is difficult to ascertain. If
recent developments in New York are any indication, it seems that utilities may
cautiously embrace the trading future. To illustrate, consider lessons learned from
the theory on disruption of industries to monopolists, as in the case of Uber’s
disruption of the taxicab industry. One major caveat is in order at the outset: the
concept of “disruption” has been co-opted and diluted almost to the point of
meaninglessness.265 Popular wisdom about the disruption narrative is that a new
technology enters the scene and quickly displaces the old with a business model
superior to the previous one. Some opine any large legacy industry can—or should—
be ripe for bypassing of incumbents by innovators who start with little more than
ideas and crash sessions developing computer code.266 Like the taxicab industry, the
electric distribution industry consists of regulated monopolies, often portrayed as
economic dinosaurs less nimble at innovation than their counterparts, and ripe for
the immediate taking.
The literature on disruptive technologies cautions against the narrative of
immediate dislocation as a less-than-accurate portrayal of transformative change.
Instead, disruptive innovation theory, as first popularized by Harvard professor
Clayton Christensen, suggests that “disruption” describes a process whereby a
smaller company with fewer resources is able to successfully challenge established
incumbents by targeting overlooked segments of the value chain, gaining a foothold
by delivering more suitable functionality—frequently at a lower price.267 Then, the
incoming firm moves up the value chain, eventually displacing the incumbent firm
in the provision of its product or service.268 Some caution is in order here, as
264
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Christensen’s theory has been criticized for its post hoc perspective that makes it
prone to hindsight biases.269 And the oft-quoted example of Uber is not a disruptive
innovation for two reasons: Uber did not arise by “appealing to low end or unserved
consumers and then migrat[ing] to the mainstream market,” nor did it offer a product
that existing customers initially viewed as inferior.270 Uber offered the very same
product as taxicab incumbents—rides. Christensen distinguishes this from
disruptions, calling it a “sustaining innovation” that makes the existing product
better.271
Despite its limitations, Christensen’s theory has considerable appeal in this
context for explaining how incumbent firms resist change. He argues that forcing
full industry disruption will prompt incumbents to accelerate efforts to defend their
business by offering even better services or products at comparable prices, acquiring
entrants, or resisting change with any other means at their disposal, particularly if
they enjoy monopoly protection.272 Taxi companies, for example, have worked
through municipal governments to resist Uber and other ride-sharing services.
It seems only logical, therefore, that incumbent utilities will resist efforts to turn
them into independent distribution system operators. The past experience with retail
restructuring is telling, as moving from the relative safety of cost-of-service
regulation to a completely market-based, freewheeling competitive environment
would be as risky for utilities in some ways as retail restructuring was. Many electric
utilities resisted retail restructuring with a wide variety of strategies,273 including
often exaggerated claims that their investments were “stranded costs” for which they
must be compensated.274 Any reform efforts should, therefore, prepare for a variety
of utility strategies to respond to the transformative changes already under way275
grid, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 24, 2015), https://theconversation.com/why-rooftop-solaris-disruptive-to-utilities-and-the-grid-39032 [https://perma.cc/54GY-TP6A].
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and those proposed here; including outright resistance. However, the New York
REV proceedings offer cause for hope that incumbent utilities may, ultimately,
embrace the transition to a new system of markets.
As for new entrants into the electricity sector, they tend to have fundamentally
different resources and competences than incumbents. New entrants enter the scene
armed with different technologies and more efficient processes tailored to compete
successfully in these disruptive markets.276 In the end, however, their ability to
succeed often depends on the evolutionary and revolutionary discoveries they make
and on crucial support from federal and state governments to help overcome market
barriers.277
D. Security and Reliability Challenges
Revamping the distribution system will have numerous implications for
reliability, security, and privacy, presenting complex challenges to state regulators
whose principal task until now was ensuring the provision of sufficient electricity to
meet demand under the cost-of-service ratemaking model.
In terms of reliability, DERs’ intermittent output can lead to greater forecast
errors and exacerbate the risk of adverse system impacts. Recent research shows that
large shares of solar, wind, and other intermittent renewables can be integrated into
the grid without negative impacts on the reliability of service.278 Increased output
volatility and forecast uncertainty for DERs and other renewables will, however,
require greater efforts by grid operators and ancillary service providers.279 An
intelligent mix of DERs could help alleviate some of these problems if, for example,
demand response was used to balance the intermittency of solar and wind
resources.280
As Amy Stein has noted, “reliability” in the changing mix of resources in the
electricity sector now encompasses a wide range of actions necessary to maintain
system performance.281 The evolving scope and nature of reliability services raise
questions about the governance structure for assuring reliability and where
responsibility for any one reliability initiative or standard should fall. At the
wholesale level, balancing authorities are required to meet federally mandated
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reliability standards that define requirements for planning and operations.282
Maintaining reliable operation of the local distribution grid, meanwhile, falls to the
states. The new power trading paradigm would require increasing interactions
between the two systems that warrant regulatory attention to ensure proper
coordination and a shared allocation of responsibilities across federal and state
regulators.283
The proliferation of DERs and the resulting decentralization of grid assets and
(to some extent) control, also present potential new security vulnerabilities.284
Increased reliance on markets that require the instantaneous exchange of large data
volumes exacerbates vulnerabilities. The October 2016 attack on the Internet aptly
demonstrates the severe risks of failing to properly address cybersecurity
challenges.285 Many DERs and devices that control them will be located at customer
sites with little or no computer security and with owners who have minimal or no
cybersecurity expertise. DER interactions involve many different domains and
organizations, and no single entity has yet been tasked with maintaining
cybersecurity. Many different communication protocols and standards are currently
being used that often have inadequate security capabilities. Some DERs are
automated and others will rely on wireless communications, adding further
opportunities for attack. Finally, while research is underway to address these
challenges,286 experts who understand both DER functionality and cybersecurity are
few and far between.287
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As yet, there is no regularized means of addressing these issues, except for
federal standards applicable to the bulk power system.288 Some frameworks offer
guidelines for utilities,289 but they lack the granularity necessary to identify and
address problems faced by individual PUCs that may require strategies tailored to
their specific network circumstances. One recent review of implementation of the
frameworks stated that they “lack concrete, practical procedures that implement”
them290 resulting in a patchwork of standards and procedures. Many PUCs have yet
to act concretely, often due to a lack of in-house expertise paired with limited
awareness of their own system vulnerabilities and the range of available strategies.291
In short, the technologies and market frameworks that would bring about a
modern grid would simultaneously increase the grid’s potential vulnerabilities,
particularly at the interfaces between DERs and the rest of the grid. The new
electricity trading ecosystem will, therefore, require significant and concerted efforts
to analyze vulnerabilities and develop protective measures to mitigate physical and
cybersecurity issues.
From a privacy perspective, finally, the new power trading paradigm’s reliance
on markets may require fundamentally redefined frameworks for data handling and
privacy. Market designers in New York have already identified a wide range of
system data that could be made more readily available to nonutility actors. ESCOs
and others could use this data to identify and meet potential customer needs through
new products and services added to their market offerings.292 Scholars have already
identified privacy concerns with collecting data from smart meters, particularly if
the data could be released to a third party without customer authorization.293
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Pioneering states such as California have responded with statutory and regulatory
policies designed to provide safeguards.294 Increased reliance on markets and the
robust exchange of information will require increased attention to data security and
privacy issues.
E. Equity Challenges
Like any change of this magnitude, the transformation of electricity from a
basic service to a widely traded commodity has implications for distributional
fairness and equity.295 However diverse the pool of participants in an electricity
trading economy, it will create economic winners and losers. A middle-class
homeowner with good credit, for example, may be able to put solar panels on his
roof to generate and sell his own electricity in newly created markets. The same
economic opportunities, however, may not be available to renters or homeowners
with less access to capital or debt.296 From a ratepayer perspective, a two-class
system may emerge that enables some ratepayers to actively participate in and
benefit from the newly created markets while others continue to consume electricity
in the same passive role they have had since the early days of electrification.
Carefully crafted incentives and rules for market participation can mitigate but not
altogether eliminate these and other inequities.297
Still, the proposed power trading paradigm will, on the whole, prove more
equitable than the current system for two reasons. First, liquidity and transparency
are not simply virtues of well-designed markets and necessary for innovation in the
grid. Some commentators fear that, in the current policy landscape, certain benefits
of renewable energy flow disproportionately to a select few due to knowledge and
cost asymmetries.298 In response, open access, combined with market opportunities
for new types of resources, will allow for more widespread popular participation in
294
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the electricity sector than the utility-centric status quo, thereby creating more
winners than losers.
Second, the new electricity trading ecosystem will accelerate the deployment
of solar, storage, and other sustainable energy technologies that deliver considerable
environmental benefits, such as climate change mitigation, air quality
improvements, and water conservation. These benefits cannot be appropriated by
the economic beneficiaries but, rather, spill over to the general public. Studies have
repeatedly shown that socioeconomically disadvantaged parts of the population
suffer from higher exposure levels to electricity-related environmental pollutants.299
As solar, wind, and other sustainable energy technologies replace coal and other
fossil-fueled power plants, the associated environmental benefits will accrue
disproportionately to low-income communities.
This Article does not conclude that liquid markets will address all equity
concerns,300 but market structures that reduce barriers to access can catalyze
significant progress toward involvement of a broader spectrum of participants. This
Article does not argue that markets always broaden participation; consolidation of
the past few decades in industries such as the airlines suggests otherwise. There can
be little doubt, however, that the proposed power trading paradigm offers a more
inclusive and, hence, superior alternative to today’s monopolistic domination of
distribution systems and extremely limited consumer choice.
F. Other Policy Considerations
Public utilities have traditionally assumed the obligation to serve customers
within their service territories, although the “duty to serve” has been modified in
states that have embraced retail restructuring.301 Even restructured states with a more
competitive environment, however, typically require distribution utilities to serve
retail customers, naming them as “provider of last resort” for what is also known as
“standard offer” service.302 The provider of last resort serves as the backstop supplier
of electricity for customers who have not chosen an alternative supplier. The advent
of state electricity markets proposed in this Article will require PUCs to take similar
measure in order to ensure reliable service for consumers who choose not to rely on
the markets for all or part of their electricity needs.
To be clear, the proposed electricity trading ecosystem is not intended to force
consumers happy with their current electricity service to switch to market-based
procurement. Rather, the framework presumes that markets will coexist with the
existing electricity distribution system for the foreseeable future. In keeping with the
299
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evolutionary nature of this proposal, the new power trading paradigm is intended to
create new opportunities to trade electricity for interested parties. Thus, today’s
distribution utilities are anticipated to continue to provide the equivalent of standard
offers to customers who choose not to avail themselves of the markets.
The coexistence of new markets alongside the tried-and-true system of utility
service to customers poses distinct challenges for market design. Consider, for
example, the interdependence between standard offers and market competition:
more of the former might lead to less of the latter and vice versa.303 The terms and
conditions of standard offer service, therefore, are bound to impact pricing and other
attributes of the platform. Standard offer rates, for instance, will shape the
attractiveness of the markets and arbitrage opportunities for utilities serving as
platform administrators, as is the case in states that adopted retail restructuring.
Another issue that warrants attention is long-term planning, akin to the
ISOs/RTOs’ planning processes. Some propose that distribution utilities use an
“integrated distribution planning” (“IDP”) process, similar to the familiar
“integrated resource planning” (“IRP”) that utilities undertake in a majority of states,
including some with restructured retail electricity markets.304 In an IDP process, the
distribution utility would proactively forecast the potential for DER growth on its
system, and plan for its integration. For example, the utility might be required to
identify infrastructure necessary to accommodate a specific anticipated resource
coming online.305 Building on this work, the authors recommend a planning process
that forecasts resources brought to a platform over the near and long term. Following
the IRP example, the goal of this process is not to change the network, but to
accommodate an influx of DERs on it. This function could be provided by the market
administrator, as envisioned by the New York REV proceedings,306 or by another
firm that offered this service.
CONCLUSION
At the dawn of the new millennium, Sir Arthur C. Clarke famously predicted
that by 2016, all currencies would be abolished, and the megawatt hour of electricity
would become the standard unit of exchange.307 Clarke would find it strange that no
303
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consumer markets exist today for electricity, one of the most omnipresent and
indispensable commodities. A properly designed electricity trading ecosystem will
have the pervasiveness and liquidity that motivated Clarke’s prediction.
A kilowatt hour of electricity is, in many ways, as fungible as an ear of corn or
a bushel of wheat. There are, however, critical differences that distinguish electricity
from other commodities and, even more so, currencies. Unlike food crops and most
other commodities, electric power cannot be shipped long distance by truck, rail, or
vessel but, instead, requires delivery through a sophisticated and costly network of
transmission and distribution lines. Outside of extreme inflation or deflation events,
one U.S. dollar will buy the same amount of bread regardless of the time of day. In
contrast, the value of a kilowatt hour of electricity may easily vary by a factor of ten
or more depending on what time of day it is deliveredgenerated. These and other
spatiotemporal sensitivities of electric power not only stand in the way of Sir Arthur
Clarke’s prophecy, they require a radical rethinking of America’s electricity
industry.
Much of the physical infrastructure, regulatory institutions, and business
models of today’s electric grid date back to the early days of electrification when
electricity was generated by monopoly utilities in large, remotely sited power plants
and delivered to ratepayers via wires designed for one way traffic. These structures
may have helped establish America’s electricity industry. But they are ill-equipped
to address the challenges and opportunities presented by the proliferation of smallerscale distributed energy resources at the edge of the grid, fast-paced technology and
business model innovation, and anthropogenic climate change, among others.
This Article proposes a new electricity trading ecosystem that relies on a system
of competitive markets to bring the electric utility industry into the twenty-first
century. This Article refines and expands pilot initiatives currently under way in
California and New York to complement existing wholesale power markets with
new distribution-level markets that enable widespread participation in electricity
trading, from incumbent utilities to residential ratepayers. Enhanced market access
will allow previously captive consumers to emancipate themselves from their local
utilities while also ensuring the proper valuation of energy resources based on their
spatiotemporal generation characteristics.
The electric utility industry has famously resisted reform efforts of any sort for
decades. And change, however necessary and beneficial in the long run, will not
come easily, let alone overnight. Accordingly, this proposal does not start with a
clean slate but, rather, envisions a hybrid system where competitive markets under
the auspices of state and federal regulators coexist with traditional utility governance
structures until regulators and stakeholders alike have had time to adjust to the new
market realities.
The proposed power trading paradigm is not without its own growing pains and
challenges, such as those related to the reliability, security, and equity implications
of the new electricity trading ecosystem. Some might question, for example, whether
markets can protect consumer interests as well as rate regulation. The answer to
these and other questions will depend on the choices of state and federal regulators
that will likely evolve over time. Mindful of these iterative policy learning processes,

118

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

the authors have here laid out the core goals and attributes deemed indispensable
elements of an ecosystem that facilitates free trade for electric power, leaving design
and implementation details for future research and policy experimentation across the
state laboratories of democracy.

